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Introduction
The Netherlands East Indies were occupied by the Japanese army between 1942 and
1945. Many soldiers of the Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger (KNIL, Royal Netherlands
Indies Army) were captured as prisoners of war (POW). These people were used as forced
labourers, like the Japanese did with Indonesian workers (romusha) later during the war.
Shortly  after  the  start  of  the  occupation,  the  Dutch  colonial  government  and  army
command went into exile. The former established a Dutch camp in Brisbane, Australia as a
government-in-exile,  while  the  latter  settled  in  Colombo,  Ceylon  (Sri  Lanka).  These
colonial leaders were preparing for the post-war situation. They mainly focused on how to
restore colonial rule in the Netherlands East Indies. This included re-establishment of the
colonial army. The KNIL was established in 1830 and consisted of Dutch, other European
and locally recruited Indonesian soldiers. A little over 90,000 soldiers served in the KNIL in
1942. The KNIL failed to defend the Netherlands East Indies during the Japanese attack in
1941 and 1942 and surrendered on 8 March 1942. The subsequent Japanese occupation
lasted until 15 August 1945. What the Dutch did not expect, and did not prepare for, was a
complete change of the political situation in the Netherlands East Indies during the Second
World  War:  independence  was  declared  after  the  Japanese  surrender  and  a  violent
revolution broke out. British forces, who were responsible for taking over the power from
the Japanese army decided in  October  1945 that  no  more  Dutch  armed forces were
allowed to re-enter the Netherlands East Indies. Dutch former POWs were thus forced to
stay in camps elsewhere in Southeast Asia, in Siam (Thailand), Burma, Singapore and the
Philippines.1 The  nationalist  proclamation  of  17  August  1945  was  followed  by  the
Indonesian Independence War, that lasted from 1945 until 1949. On 27 December 1949,
the Netherlands recognised Indonesian independence and the Dutch withdrew their troops
in  1950.  Since Indonesia  became an independent  country,  the colonial  army was not
needed anymore. The KNIL was liquidated on 26 July 1950.
During  and  after  the  Second  World  War,  the  Dutch  made  many  plans  for  re-
establishment of Dutch colonial rule as soon as the Japanese would have been defeated.
The plans that were made during the war had to be adjusted to the post-war situation. The
Dutch  had  to  negotiate  with  different  Allied  governments  and  the  newly  established
1 E.  Touwen-Bouwsma  and  P.  Groen,  Tussen  Banzai  en  Bersiap.  De  afwikkeling  van  de  Tweede
Wereldoorlog in Nederlands-Indië (Den Haag 1996) 14; 22-23.
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Indonesian Republic. The question in this thesis is what actions the Dutch took for re-
establishment of the KNIL during and after the Second World War. This re-establishment
was needed to restore Dutch colonial rule in the Netherlands East Indies. The analysis of
how these plans were made and how they were adjusted is divided into two time periods:
during the Second World War and during the seven months that followed the Japanese
surrender. 
The Dutch  government's  expectations about  the  return  to  the  Netherlands East
Indies differed very much from reality. To what extent the Dutch were able to carry out their
plans  is  handled,  as  well  as  what  the  KNIL  soldiers  themselves  thought  of  the
governmental plans.  This thesis research focuses on the re-establishment of the KNIL,
which was much-needed hence the political and military situation on Java and Sumatra in
the second half of 1945. Communication between different colonial and military leaders is
researched and how these  leaders  have different  opinions  about  military  and  political
actions that should be taken. Sources that are used focus on communication between, and
decision-making of, different officials of the colonial administration and the colonial army,
who were situated at different places in Asia and Australia, and with foreign actors as well:
the British, Australians and Americans that were present in the Asia-Pacific war theatre.
The Dutch colonial government's choice to settle in British territories after the defeat
of the Netherlands East Indies and the KNIL was not accidental. Great Britain had the
largest fleet in South and Southeast Asia, and they were responsible for the South East
Asia Command (SEAC). Within this command, the British were responsible for Sumatra
only. When the war was almost over, the British were made responsible for the entire
Netherlands East Indies territories.2 The Dutch leaders wanted to be close to where the
decisions about the archipelago were made. Members of the Dutch colonial administration
and  the  colonial  army commanders  continued,  however  in  different  places  in  Asia,  to
communicate with each other and with representatives of foreign governments. A lot of this
communication  survived  and  is  nowadays  studied,  because  of  its  importance  for  the
course of the wars in the Netherlands East Indies. The colonial government also resumed
communication with KNIL soldiers after the Japanese surrender.
The period that is discussed here is limited to 1942 until March 1946, with a focus
on 1944 and 1945. These last two years did not yet receive the scholarly attention they
deserve. Especially the time between 17 August 1945 and March 1946 is rarely discussed
on its own, as can be determined from the existing historiography. In most literature on the
2 J.A. de Moor, Generaal Spoor. Triomf en tragiek van een legercommandant (Amsterdam 2011) 106.
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Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia in the 1940s, a division is made between the Second
World War and the Indonesian Independence War. The start of the Independence War can
be  set  at  17  August  1945,  when  nationalist  leaders  Sukarno  and  Hatta  proclaimed
independence  of  the  Republik  Indonesia. It  ended  at  27  December  1949,  when  the
Netherlands  recognised  the  independence  and  withdrew from Indonesia.  The  Second
World War lasted worldwide from 1939 until 1945, and in the Netherlands East Indies from
8 December 1941 until  15 August 1945.  In historiography, these two wars are usually
researched separately.3
There are not many books on the transitional period between the two wars. Some
titles are Tussen Banzai en Bersiap about the outcomes of the war for various groups in
the  Netherlands  East  Indies,  such  as  POWs,  romusha,  and  civilian  internees,4 and
Dennis's  Troubled days of peace on British SEAC commander Lord Mountbatten.5 The
adaptation  of  war  diaries  written  by  POWs working  on  the  Birma-Siam  railway  is  an
example of scholarly research that stops at 17 August, when the POWs noted down in
their diaries that they had heard the war was over.6
This  shortcoming  in  current  historiography,  which  is  also  discussed  in  this
introduction, needs correction. The time period between the Japanese surrender and the
arrival of newly recruited Dutch troops from the Netherlands in March 1946 was important
for the course of the Independence War. This is not only because of the Bersiap, but also
influenced the  course of  the Independence War, with  all  its  different  kinds of  soldiers
fighting in it. Indische people were influenced in their thinking about decolonisation by the
liquidation of the KNIL after the Dutch recognition of Indonesia's independence and the
subsequent migration of Indische people and Moluccans to the Netherlands.7 This thesis
3 Some publications on the Second World War: L. de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede
Wereldoorlog  volumes 11a, 11b and 11c ('s Gravenhage 1984-1986); on the Independence War: W.H.
Frederick, S. Soeroto and A.W. Adam,  Pemahaman sejarah Indonesia. Sebelum dan sesudah revolusi
(Jakarta 1982), P.M.H. Groen, Marsroutes en dwaalsporen. Het Nederlands militair-strategisch beleid in
Indonesië 1945-1950  (Leiden 1991);  Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung,  From the Formation of the State of
East Indonesia Towards the Establishment of the United States of Indonesia  (Yogyakarta 1985); J.J.P. de
Jong,  Diplomatie  of  strijd.  Het  Nederlandse  beleid  tegenover  de  Indonesische  revolutie  1945-1947
(Amsterdam 1988); and the series about the governmental communication between the Netherlands and
Indonesia,  S.L.  van  der  Wal  (ed.),  Officiële  bescheiden  betreffende  de  Nederlands-Indonesische
betrekkingen 1945-1950 (in 20 volumes, 1971-1996) (herinafter referred to as NIB I, II etc.).
4 Touwen-Bouwsma and Groen, Tussen Banzai en Bersiap.
5 P. Dennis, Troubled days of peace. Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, 1945-1946 (Manchester
1987).
6 M.  Heijmans-van  Bruggen  (ed.),  De  Japanse  bezetting  in  dagboeken.  De  Birma-Siam  spoorlijn
(Amsterdam 2001) 427.
7 There were several  types of  Indische  people:  Indo-Dutch people,  descendants from a Dutch and an
Indonesian ancestor, and totoks, Dutch people born in either the Netherlands or in the Netherlands East
Indies. Both groups migrated en masse to the Netherlands during and after the Indonesian Independence
War. The expression Indisch(e) is will be left untranslated, since it does not have a proper translation in
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fills  the  gap  in  current  historiography  by  focusing  on  the  events  and  changes  that
happened during this time.
This research uses the communication between the aforementioned colonial offices
in  Ceylon  and  Australia  and  its  most  important  actors.  Also,  communication  with  the
Supreme Allied Commander of SEAC (SACSEA), Lord Mountbatten, was important for the
Dutch plans for after the Second World War. SEAC was assigned the entire area of the
Netherlands East Indies after 15 August 1945, and therefore Lord Mountbatten was the
single  most  important  person  to  convince  of  the  Dutch  plans.  The  KNIL  soldiers
themselves, who were POWs during the war, and were stuck in Southeast Asia afterwards,
sent  letters to the Dutch representatives in their  area or the Queen.  In  this  way, they
expressed their dissatisfaction with their situation, and made clear that they had expected
another treatment from the Dutch and colonial government. These letters, found among
governmental  documentation,  are  stored  in  the  National  Archive.8 Organisations  like
RAPWI (Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees, which was part of SEAC),
NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) and KDP (Kantoor Displaced Persons) were
all  established  during  this  time.  They  also  communicated  with  officials  of  the  colonial
government and army. Personal archives of politicians and military leaders like Lieutenant-
Governor-General H.J. van Mook, KNIL Colonel D.C. Buurman van Vreeden and army
commander Lieutenant-Admiral C.E.L. Helfrich are used as well.
Historiography
Numerous books and articles have been written about the Second World War and the
Indonesian  Independence War.  The latter  was  until  recently  known as  'police  actions'
(politionele acties) in the Netherlands. Careful thoughts have been put in why I choose the
expression 'Indonesian Independence War'. I consider a euphemistically given name like
'police actions', 'emergency' or 'rebellion' as old-fashioned and ignorant to the historical
situation. The word 'revolution' would not cover the entire conflict, since actually multiple
revolutions  took place  at  the  same time.  Furthermore,  with  'Indonesian  Independence
War', I intend to view this war above all as something that started as an Indonesian matter
of becoming an independent country. The two Dutch 'police actions', among more military
actions, took place in response to the Indonesian independence claim.9 I will however use
English. The word Moluccans is nowadays used for the old word Ambonese.
8 These letters can be found the archives of the Dutch Liaison Officier at the General Headquarters in New
Delhi and the Netherlands East Indies Liaison Mission at the General Headquarters of the Allied Land
Forces South East Asia and the Ministry of Defence, National Archive in The Hague.
9 In  recent  publications,  scholars  also  used  the  expression  'Indonesian  Independence  War'.  See  for
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the expression 'Netherlands East Indies' instead of Indonesia, since the main part of my
thesis research handles the time when the archipelago was still occupied by the Japanese,
and the Republik Indonesia had not yet been established.
Literature on the Netherlands East Indies between 1941 and 1945 is mostly focused
on military history, on the Japanese attack and the general course of the Second World
War.  Also,  a  lot  of  attention  goes  to  people's  lives  during  the  war,  like  people  who
experienced prisoner camps. More attention is paid to people inside camps like POWs or
civilian  internees,  than  to  Inhabitants  Friendly  To  Us  (IFTUs),  in  Dutch  known  as
buitenkampers.  These  were  mostly  Indo-Dutch  people,  who  did  not  spent  the  war  in
internment camps, and were especially in danger during the  Bersiap. This was the time
between September and December 1945, when (Indo-)Dutch and Chinese citizens were
violently threatened by pemuda, Indonesian youth groups. The estimation is that between
3,500 and 20,000 civilians  died.10 In  1989,  Van Delden graduated on a thesis  on the
Bersiap in Bandung. Her work was the first in Dutch that had focused on the Bersiap only.
In recent years, attention for the Bersiap has grown more and resulted in a monograph on
the topic, written by Bussemaker, a first-hand witness, historian and activist for  Indische
affairs.11 Also, in non-Dutch historiography attention is paid to the British presence in the
archipelago in 1945-1946, such as books by Dennis and McMillan.12
Much attention is given to the course of the Indonesian Independence War between
1945 and 1950.13 In the Netherlands, research of war crimes committed by soldiers of the
Dutch and colonial army in the Netherlands East Indies has been carried out since 1969,
when Dutch veteran Joop Hueting confessed on national television that he had been part
of a group of soldiers that committed war crimes (then euphemistically called 'excesses').
Military strategies and political policies from 1945 until 1950 have also been researched
widely. This includes publications on the longer history of the Netherlands East Indies by
example: I.V. Lessmeister,  Between colonialism and cold war. The Indonesian war of independence in
world politics 1945-1949 (Ithaca NY 2012); R. Limpach, “Business as usual. Dutch mass violence in the
Indonesian  war  of  independence  1945-49”  in:  B.  Luttikhuis  and  A.  Dirk  Moses,  Colonial
counterinsurgency and mass violence. The Dutch empire in Indonesia (London 2014) 64-90; P. Romijn,
“Learning on 'the job'. Dutch war volunteers entering the Indonesian war of independence, 1945-46”,
Journal of Genocide Research 14:3-4 (2012) 317-336.
10 H.Th. Bussemaker, Bersiap! Opstand in het paradijs. De Bersiap-periode op Java en Sumatra 1945-1946
(Zuthpen 2013) 342.
11 Bussemaker, Bersiap!; M.C. van Delden, Bersiap in Bandoeng. Een onderzoek naar geweld in de periode
van 17 augustus 1945 tot 24 maart 1946 (Doctoral thesis, University of Amsterdam, 1989).
12 Dennis, Troubled days of peace; R. McMillan, The British occupation of Indonesia 1945-1946. Britain, the
Netherlands and the Indonesian revolution (London 2005); P. Ziegler, Mountbatten. The official biography
(London 1985).
13 Usually, the time period is stated as 1945-1950 because the Dutch army only left Indonesia in 1950.
5
Van den Doel and J.J.P. de Jong.14 As De Jong analyses correctly, the debate on this topic
is variable and scholars seldom agree with each other, which also has to do with their
nationality. De Jong considers himself a 'revisionist', who believes that the Dutch policy for
the Netherlands East Indies was one of gradual decolonisation under Dutch influence. His
main  opponent  in  this  debate  is  Van  den  Doel,  whom  De  Jong  refers  to  as  a
'traditionalist'.15 In most Indonesian, American and Australian literature, it is also assumed
that the Netherlands wanted to continue their colonial rule. These scholars consider the
British 'collaborating' with the Dutch to retain colonial power.16 Until the 1980s, the focus on
the  war  was  mainly  on  the  Indonesians  –  the  winners.  The  book  Nationalism  and
revolution in Indonesia was the first publication (1952) in this pattern, which is followed by
many more books on the Indonesian side of the war.17 The focus on Indonesia shifted
since De Jong's PhD defence in 1988: scholars started to pay attention to the Dutch side
as well.18 Since then, more researchers have obtained their PhD degree for research on
the Dutch side of the war, such as Groen in 1991, Scagliola in 2002, Zweers in 2013 and
Limpach  in  2015.19 Their  research  includes  knowledge  about  the  role  of  the  Dutch
government in making propaganda for the war against the Republic, Dutch warfare and
strategy  during  the  Independence  War,  and  reception  of  the  war  in  veterans'  circles
decades after  the  war.  Scholarly  focus also  lies  on the  KNIL:  Zwitzer  and Heshusius
collaborated on multiple books on the colonial army, most of these contain photo material
from the colonial period.20 Researchers working for the Dutch army also write about the
14 H.W.  van  den  Doel,  Het  Rijk  van  Insulinde.  Opkomst  en  ondergang  van  een  Nederlandse  kolonie
(Amsterdam 1996); H.W. van den Doel, Afscheid van Indië. De val van het Nederlandse imperium in Azië
(Amsterdam 2001); H.W. van den Doel, Zo ver de wereld strekt (Amsterdam 2011); De Jong, Diplomatie
of strijd; J.J.P. de Jong, Avondschot. Hoe Nederland zich terugtrok uit zijn Aziatisch imperium (Amsterdam
2011); J.J.P. de Jong, De terugtocht. Nederland en de dekolonisatie van Indonesië (Amsterdam 2015).
15 P.J. Drooglever, "J.J.P. de Jong, Diplomatie of strijd. Een analyse van het Nederlands beleid tegenover de
Indonesische  revolutie  1945-1947”  [book  review]  in:  BMGN  105:2  (1990)  308-310;  J.J.P.  de  Jong,
“Traditionalistische visie op dekolonisatie van Indië” [review essay H.W. van den Doel, Afscheid van Indië.
De val van het Nederlandse imperium in Azië  (Amsterdam 2001)] in:  Internationale Spectator  January
(2001) 40-44.
16 De Jong, Diplomatie of strijd, 10-11.
17 G. McTurnan Kahin,  Nationalism and revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca NY 1952);  B. Anderson,  Java in a
time  of  revolution.  Occupation  and  resistance  1944-1946  (Ithaca  NY  1972);  F.  Colombijn  and  J.T.
Lindblad (eds.),  Roots of violence in Indonesia. Contemporary violence in historical perspective (Leiden
2002).
18 De Jong, Diplomatie of strijd, 9-11.
19 Groen, Marsroutes en dwaalsporen; S. Scagliola, Last van de oorlog. De Nederlandse oorlogsmisdaden
in  Indonesië  en  hun  verwerking  (Amsterdam 2002);  L.  Zweers,  De gecensureerde  oorlog.  Militairen
versus de media in Nederlands-Indië 1945-1949 (Zutphen 2013); Publication of R. Limpach's PhD thesis
is expected in 2016, with the title De brandende dorpen van Generaal Spoor.
20 H.L. Zwitzer and C.A. Heshusius,  Het Koninklijk Nederlands-Indische Leger 1830-1950. Een terugblik
(The  Hague  1977);  H.L.  Zwitzer,  "Het  Koninklijk  Nederlands-Indisch  Leger  in  Australië  1942-1945",
Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis Landmachtstaf VIII (1985) 67-90.
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colonial forces, such as Elands and Teitler.21 They exclusively write military history, that
also  learns  us  about  the  friction  that  always  occurs  between  politics  and  the  army.
Oostindie's book on egodocuments written by Dutch soldiers on the Independence War
analyses  how  these  soldiers  changed  their  opinions  about  the  war  constantly,  also
decades after it took place.22 
During recent years (2012-now), the question for a more extensive research about
the Indonesian Independence War was constantly raised. The initial call for more research
was urged by several lawsuits against the Dutch state about responsibility for war crimes
that took place during the Independence War.23 Unfortunately, the focus during discussions
stayed on the Independence War, and attention for the Bersiap period was only sidelong
called for, nor was given attention to the situation of the colonial government and army
directly after 15 August 1945. The entire Dutch historiography on the last decade of the
Netherlands East Indies has, in my opinion, been too much focused on the 'Netherlands',
and not on the 'Indies', and not at all on 'Indonesia'. This also makes veterans from both
KNIL and the  Koninklijke Landmacht  (KL, Royal Army) who live in the Netherlands feel
ignored.  The number of people living in the Netherlands with an Indische background is
estimated  around  900,000.  This  number,  which  includes  veterans  from  the  KNIL and
Moluccans, but also second and third generation offspring, makes  Indische  people the
largest 'migrant' group in the country.24
In  the  Netherlands,  collective  memory  about  the  Second  World  War  and
Independence War in Indonesia is shaped in the same way as the historiography:  the
division  between  the  two  wars  is  visible  in  both  memory  culture  (collective  cultural
memory) and memorial culture (culture of remembrance). Every year on 15 August,  the
21 Military historical research is conducted at both the Netherlands Institute for Military History (NIMH) and
the Royal Military Academy (KMA), the bachelor course for officers of the Dutch army.
M.  Elands  (ed.),  Van  strijd  tot  veteranenbeleid.  Het  Koninklijk  Nederlands-Indisch  Leger  en  zijn
veteranen, 1941-2001  (Amsterdam 2001); G. Teitler,  De weg terug naar Indië 1942-1945. Strategiën,
conflicten, frustraties  (s.l.19XX); G. Teitler,  Vlootvoogd in de knel. Vice-admiraal A.S. Pinke tussen de
marinestaf, Indië en de Indonesische revolutie (Assen 1990).
22 G. Oostindie, Soldaat in Indonesië 1945-1950. Getuigenissen van een oorlog aan de verkeerde kant van
de geschiedenis (Amsterdam 2015).
23 Volkskrant, 19 June 2012.
24 This estimation is based on two publications:  M. de Vries,  ‘Indisch is een gevoel’.  De tweede en derde
generatie Indische Nederlanders  (Amsterdam 2009) 367-368; Beets, G.C.N., E. van Imhoff, and C.C.
Huisman,  “Demografie  van  de Indische  Nederlanders,  1930-2001”,  Bevolkingstrends  eerste  kwartaal
2003 (CBS) 58-66.  The Central Bureau for Statistics estimated the number of first generation Indische
Dutch in 2008 around 124,000 and the second generation around 263,000. With a reproduction factor of
2.1, the third generation would be around 552,000 in 2008 (my estimation). This makes a total of around
939,000 people. A part of the first generation has died since 2008, thus around 900,000 people with an
Indische background live in the Netherlands in 2016. The fact that these people, which stretches three
generations now, have a historical  connection with the former Netherlands East Indies does not say
anything about their emotional connection.
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Japanese surrender and the Dutch victims of the Second World War in the Netherlands
East  Indies  are  commemorated  at  the  Indisch  Monument  in  The  Hague,  without  any
reference  to  the  Bersiap  period  that  immediately  followed  after  this  surrender.  The
subsequent Independence War is only commemorated from the point of view of the Dutch
soldiers that were sent overseas to re-establish colonial rule. This takes place on the first
Saturday of September in Roermond. There is no general remembrance day for the entire
Dutch colonial history.
There is obviously a lack of attention in historical research for the period between
15  August  1945  and  March  1946  in  the  Netherlands  East  Indies.  This  is  remarkable
because several important changes took place during this time. The Japanese army was
no  longer  in  control  of  the  Netherlands  East  Indies.  Sukarno  and  Hatta  proclaimed
independence  of  the  Republik  Indonesia  on  17  August,  forced  by  pemuda.  After  this
proclamation, it was relatively quiet for almost one month. On 15 September, the British
arrived on the HMS Cumberland, together with RAPWI teams and Dutch colonial officers
from NICA. Shortly upon their arrival, some KNIL units were re-established. Their presence
and actions provoked violence,  particularly  against  (Indo-)Dutch and Chinese people.25
Next to planning the re-establishment of the KNIL, the Dutch government decided in 1945
to form an army in the Netherlands to send overseas, to operate next to the recuperating
soldiers of the KNIL. These were war volunteers (oorlogsvrijwilligers) that were sent to
restore 'peace and order'. From 1946, conscripts were also sent to the Netherlands East
Indies. Restoration of colonial administration is rarely a topic in historiography. Not much
has been published on the NICA, nor did the re-establishment of the KNIL receive much
attention in historiography.26
During the second half of 1945, the Dutch could do little to nothing to protect the
people  from  the  violence  they  experienced.  Japanese  troops  were,  according  to  the
agreements of surrender, required to protect civilians during the power vacuum, but failed
to do so, and the Dutch did not have troops of their own. The volume Tussen Banzai en
Bersiap pays attention to the different groups (KNIL soldiers, European civilians, romusha)
affected by the Second World War and how the end of the war was unwinded for these
groups.27 Especially Groen's article on KNIL soldiers is important: this is so far one of the
only studies  on the situation of  KNIL soldiers directly  after  the Japanese surrender.  It
25 McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism, 143.
26 Schoonoord, who wrote his PhD dissertation on the Marine Corps, is working on a monograph on the
NICA.
27 Touwen-Bouwsma and Groen, Tussen Banzai en Bersiap.
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analyses the problems these former POWs encountered in returning to the Netherlands
East Indies, and how they ended up to be left in transit camps, some soldiers even for up
to  a  year.28 Another  article  that  partly  deals  with  the  problem  of  recuperation  and
repatriation  of  KNIL  soldiers  is  Onmacht,  ontkenning  en  onderschatting  by  Brocades
Zaalberg en Willems. They discuss the problem that Dutch civilians and soldiers still lived
in camps around Asia at the end of 1945, when the war was long over, and how they
returned  to  the  Netherlands  after  leaving  those  camps.  The  KNIL  soldiers  that  were
rehabilitated in Southeast Asia are not included in their article, which is still useful since it
discusses the problematic situation for all recuperating people in Southeast Asia.29
The focus in the historiography has also not been on the continuation of the colonial
government during the Second World War, which could not officially exist during Japanese
the occupation. The Dutch government in exile in London did at first not allow Van Mook,
who was Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies at that time, to form
an official  Netherlands  Indies  government-in-exile  in  Australia,  but  he  was  allowed  to
establish a Netherlands Indies Committee for Australia and New Zealand. This committee
became operative on 7 April 1942.30 Next to Van Mook and the offices in Australia, the
Dutch had various liaison missions at British offices and embassies in Southeast Asia: at
the General Headquarters of the India Command in New Delhi, Colonel D.C. Buurman van
Vreeden was the Dutch liaison officer, who reported to the Bevelhebber der Strijdkrachten
in het Oosten (BSO, Commander in chief of armed forces in the East), Lieutenant-Admiral
C.E.L.  Helfrich,  who  held  office  in  Colombo,  Ceylon.  The  Southeast  Asia  Command
(SEAC) and the South West Pacific Area command (SWPA) were the allied commands in
Asia and the Pacific during the Second World War. SEAC had its headquarters in New
Delhi and later moved to Kandy, Ceylon. There, the same Buurman van Vreeden worked
as  a  liaison  officer.  The  British  Embassy  and  the  Allied  Land  Forces  Southeast  Asia
(ALFSEA, the 11th British Army) near and in Singapore also received Dutch liaison officers
in the last war years.
The  current  historiography  lacks  attention  to  inter-organisational  Dutch
communication, which provides interesting information about how the Dutch prepared for
28 P.M.H.  Groen,  "Prisoners  of  war,  prisoners  of  peace.  De  opvang  van  repatriëring  van  de
krijgsgevangenen  van  het  KNIL,  augustus  1945-augustus  1946"  in:  Touwen-Bouwsma  and  Groen,
Tussen Banzai en Bersiap, 43-58.
29 T. Brocades  Zaalberg  and  W. Willems,  "Onmacht,  ontkenning  en  onderschatting.  De  evacuatie  van
Nederlanders  uit  Zuidoost-Azië  na  de  Tweede  Wereldoorlog",  in:  C.  Kristel  (ed.),  Binnenskamers.
Terugkeer en opvang na de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Besluitvorming (Amsterdam 2002) 63-92.
30 T. van den Berge, H.J. van Mook 1894-1965. Een vrij en gelukkig Indonesië (Bussum 2014) 166.
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the end of the war and the re-establishment of the colonial rule in the Netherlands East
Indies.  It  is  necessary  to  add  this  knowledge  to  the  existing  historiography  on  the
Netherlands East Indies, since it provides insight in how the Dutch regarded their post-war
position and how they considered the course of the independence movement. Sources
that give insight in this inter-organisational communication are the army commander's and
liaison officers' paperwork and correspondence, which are stored in the National Archive.31
The biography on Van Mook is one of the few publications that covers the longer
period of Netherlands East Indies politics. It provides insight into the different problems
Van Mook encountered in his search for a balance between Dutch and Indonesian wishes.
Also, De Moor's biography Generaal Spoor shows difficulties and disagreement between
army and politics in preparation of, and during, the Independence War.32 Other books and
articles only focus on a smaller time period, usually one of the two wars, and the books
that cover a longer period, like the publications by Van den Doel, L. de Jong and J.J.P. de
Jong, cover an area and time period too long to be specific about these couple of months
in 1945. Some Dutch and British publications that  are very specific on a certain topic
added an interesting perspective  to  the historiography, such as  Dennis'  book on Lord
Mountbatten, and Rinzema-Admiraal's book on romusha.33 Unfortunately, there does not
seem to be a middle way between focusing on a certain topic during a limited time period,
while at the same time putting events in a bigger context. 
An important book that is absent in current historiography is a monograph on the
KNIL and how this colonial army changed over time during its 120 years of existence. The
army's liquidation is however subject of a few publications.34 A connection that is not made
either is the one between Dutch politicians and colonial officers, and the plans they made
for re-establishing the colonial army. 
This thesis will not only research government plans for the re-establishment of the
31 Archives used for this internal communication are, among others, the archive of the Commander in chief
of the armed forces in the East (BSO) and the Dutch Liaison Officier at the General Headquarters in New
Delhi and the Netherlands East Indies Liaison Mission at the General Headquarters of the Allied Land
Forces South East Asia.
32 De Moor, Generaal Spoor.
33 Dennis, Troubled days of peace; W. Rinzema-Admiraal, Romusha van Java. Het laatste front 1942-1945
(Bedum 2009).
34 See for publications on the liquidation of the KNIL: A. den Hoed,  Het KNIL, een vergeten leger? Een
beleids-historische analyse van de reorganisatie van het KNIL. Het militaire personeelsbeleid van het
KNIL in de periode 1945-1951 (Doctoral thesis, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 1988); Elands, Van strijd
tot veteranenbeleid. In an article on post-war and post-colonial memory in the Netherlands, the only KNIL
soldiers that are mentioned are Moluccan soldiers who were forced to move to the Netherlands after the
Indonesian Independence War. See: I. van Ooijen and I. Raaijmakers, “Competitive or multidirectional
memory? The interaction between postwar and postcolonial  memory  in  the Netherlands”,  Journal  of
Genocide Research 14:3-4 (2012) 463-483.
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KNIL and recovery of its soldiers that were POWs during the Second World War, but will
also pay attention to the living conditions of the KNIL soldiers around Southeast Asia in
1945 and 1946, and their personal thoughts about the situation that dragged on. What
these soldiers wrote about their personal situation is important, since it reflects how most
soldiers experienced these years. Egodocuments, including letters, are a very promosing
source, which is unfortunately not extensively explored by historians yet. Egodocuments
reflect personal thoughts and opinions about anything and everything: living conditions,
social  contacts,  military life, communication with superiors, thought on the government.
Research in this thesis is based on letters written by KNIL soldiers to the organisations
that  were responsible  for  their  recovery and repatriation back to the Netherlands East
Indies: NICA, RAPWI, and KDP, and on egodocuments, which soldiers later published.
These letters and egodocuments reflect thus their personal opinions, which provides an
interesting contrast with the government policies from that time.
This  thesis  will  add  more  knowledge  to  what  is  already  known  about  the  re-
establishment of the KNIL, what plans the Dutch made for this and how these plans were
adjusted in the period between 15 August 1945 and March 1946. The Dutch encountered
severe  troubles  in  trying  to  restore  colonial  rule,  both  military  and  political.  British,
American and Australian decisions influenced the Dutch policy in this time period. Finally,
the Dutch had to accept the loss of the Netherlands East Indies, and saw hundreds of
thousands of  citizens (re)turn to the Netherlands after 1950.  It  was the first  European
empire in Asia to finally collapse after the Second World War. The war in the Netherlands
East  Indies/Indonesia  was  followed  by  many  more  independence  wars  in  (former)
colonies,  the  Dutch  armed  conflict  about  the  Netherlands  New  Guinea  (1960-1962)
included.  This  thesis  research  adds  a  refreshing  point  of  view  to  the  scholarly  field,
because it combines sources from the government with the personal testimonies of the
KNIL soldiers.  This  unique  combination  is  not  yet  made  for  KNIL soldiers  during  the
Independence  War,  who  had  a  difficult  position:  most  KNIL  soldiers  considered  the
Netherlands East Indies their motherland, while they were in Dutch military service.
Structure
This introduction is followed by the first chapter that explains the historical situation and
the  international  context  of  Second  World  War  and  the  post-war  period.  International
relations with Great Britain, Australia and the United States are stressed out, as well as the
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time period prior to the Second World War.
Ideas and plans the Dutch had about the restoration of the colonial army during the
Second World War are discussed in the second chapter. This is mainly based on archival
research on the liaison missions to the British offices in India, Ceylon and Singapore and
the Dutch government-in-exile in Brisbane. 
The third chapter focuses on the adjustments that the Dutch had to make after the
Japanese  surrender  and  the  Indonesian  proclamation  of  independence,  due  to  the
changing  political  situation  on  Java,  SEAC's  position,  and  the  possibility  that  Dutch
administrators  and soldiers  would  arrive  in  the  Netherlands East  Indies. The question
comes  up  whether  the  Dutch  administrators  considered  how  the  re-established  KNIL
would be different,  since a part of the Dutch soldiers died between 1942 and 1945, and
many other Dutch soldiers would not be able to serve again in the army directly when
needed due to personal circumstances and their mental and physical condition.
The fourth and final chapter is based on personal opinions of KNIL soldiers, derived
from letters and egodocuments. Most former POWs gathered themselves soon after the
Japanese surrender. They formed new military units, usually under command of the senior
officer in command. How did the KNIL soldiers react to the fact that they were forced to
stay in the recovery camps longer than other Allied POWs? Personal writings reflect their
thoughts from that time and also show how this period influenced the later thoughts about
decolonisation of the Netherlands East Indies.
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Chapter 1: International relations in a time of war
Introduction
This chapter looks into the historical and international  context of  the Netherlands East
Indies  and  its  government  and  army in  1945.  The  historical  background  up  to  1945,
including the Second World War, is handled first. The international context is analysed
after that. This includes the Allied co-operation in SEAC and disagreements the Dutch and
British had about which strategy to use in the Netherlands East Indies. The Dutch were
heavily influenced by the international situation of the time, and were unable to decide
about their own colonies. The British involvement in 1945 was very influential for how the
Independence War developed. The last point of discussion in this chapter is the situation
of the POWs around Asia after the Japanese surrender.
History of the Netherlands East Indies
The  Netherlands  East  Indies  were  a  Dutch  colony  since  1816.  Before  that  time,  the
Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC, Dutch East India Company) possessed parts
of the Indonesian archipelago and used it for trading purposes. After the bankruptcy of the
VOC in 1799 and the Napoleonic Wars, the Dutch government took over the colony and
started  expanding it  through different  wars,  using  it  as  both  a  trading  post  and living
colony.  Every  self-respecting  colonial  power  needed an army to  expand and maintain
colonial rule, and hence the Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger was erected in 1830. This
army fought  colonial  wars  like  the  Aceh War (1873-1914).  Unlike  other  countries,  the
Netherlands and its  colonies did not  actively  participate in  the First  World War (1914-
1918). The war did have influence on the Netherlands East Indies, mainly in economic and
political level. It also changed the colony's mentality in relationship to the motherland into a
less dependent way of thinking.35 
The Second World War turned out to be completely different, and more disastrous,
for the Netherlands East Indies. The Japanese Empire had become impendent during the
twentieth century, and the Netherlands East Indies also felt threatened. When the support
of the motherland was omitted in May 1940, the colony started to organise the defence on
its  own:  new weaponry  was ordered at  American companies  and so-called  Stads-  en
Landwachten,  mainly  Indonesians,  were  trained  and  deployed  in  Javanese  cities  and
35 K. van Dijk, The Netherlands Indies and the Great War 1914-1918 (Leiden 2007) vii.
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elsewhere in the colony.36 Around 30,000 of these forces were used to support the around
90,000 KNIL soldiers in  1942.37 Unfortunately, this  extension  and reinforcement  of  the
colonial  army did  not  help  with  the  defence of  the Netherlands East  Indies when the
Japanese Imperial Army attacked from December 1941. The KNIL was forced to surrender
on 8 March 1942. 
When the Japanese occupation started,  (Indo-)Dutch civilians and KNIL soldiers
were captured and interned in internment camps. Most Javanese solders were released
after a couple of months. Other Indonesian soldiers were less fortunate: those who had
their  origins in Menado, Timor or the Moluccas (Ambon) were mostly also imprisoned,
used as romusha, or forced to work as heiho, soldier in the Japanese army. Around 38,000
KNIL soldiers  and  4,000  soldiers  of  the  Koninklijke  Marine  (Royal  Navy)  were  taken
prisoner of war.38 In June 1942, Japan decided to build a railway between Nong Pladuk in
Siam  (Thailand)  and  Thanbyauzayat  in  Burma  (Myanmar),  a  distance  of  around  415
kilometres  partly  running  through  uninhabitable  rain  forests.  This  part  completed  the
railroad  between  Bangkok  and  Rangoon  and  was  used  to  support  the  Japanese
occupation of Burma. The British and French, prior colonisers of this area, had made plans
for  this  railway  sometime  but  never  executed  them,  because  they  had  reached  the
conclusion that building it would be impossible. The Japanese thought differently about
this. About 18,000 Dutch men, mostly KNIL soldiers, circa 43,000 other Allied POWs and
around 250,000  romusha  were transported and used as  forced labourers  to  build  the
railway in Burma and Siam. It was completed in November 1943. Around 15,500 people
lost their lives working on it, hence the nickname 'Death Railway'. From late 1943, part of
the POWs was transported to other (work) camps, in Japan and Indo-China. Also, many
POWs and romusha were left in Burma and Siam.39
After the Second World War ended in the summer of 1945, many Dutch former
POWs  remained  in  Japanese  camps.  Around  8,200  KNIL  soldiers  died  during  their
imprisonment  and  forced  labour.40 Besides  the  internment  of  soldiers,  (Indo-)Dutch
civilians had been interned in camps in the Netherlands East Indies, including spouses
36 Van den Berge, H.J. van Mook, 153; De Jong, Het Koninkrijk,11a Nederlands-Indië I tweede helft, 613-
615 and 629-631.
37 Zwitzer, "Het KNIL in Australië", 67; Zwitzer, "Enkele gegevens over krijgsgevangenen en gesneuvelden
onder de Europese militairen van het Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger gedurende de oorlog in de
Pacific (1941-1945) in:  Mededelingen Sectie Krijgsgeschiedenis I (1978) 5-23, there 13; Elands, "Strijd,
opheffing en erfenis", 15-16.
38 M. Elands, "Strijd, opheffing en erfenis van het KNIL" in: M. Elands (ed.), Van strijd tot veteranenbeleid.
Het Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger en zijn veteranen, 1941-2001 (Amsterdam 2001) 9-54, there 18.
39 Heijmans-Van Bruggen, De Japanse bezetting in dagboeken, 12-16.
40 Zwitzer and Heshusius, Het Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger, 158-161.
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and children of soldiers. Also, lots of (Indo-)Dutch civilians had not been interned, they
were able to live outside the camps or 'protected neighbourhoods', which did not mean
their  lives  were  safer.  Over  a  year  after  the  Japanese  surrender,  most  people,  both
soldiers and civilians, had returned to the Netherlands East Indies. The Independence War
was one of the reasons for the government to start evacuation to the Netherlands from
1946.41
During the Second World War, the Indonesian nationalist  movement had grown,
also  because the  Japanese encouraged this.  Some months  before  the surrender,  the
nationalist  Indonesians  were  allowed  to  establish  the  Preparatory  Committee  for
Indonesian  Independence  (Panitia  Persiapan  Kemerdekaan  Indonesia,  PPKI).42 In  the
power vacuum that emerged after the Japanese surrender, the nationalist leaders and the
pemudas,  the  young  people  that  supported  the  independence  movement,  seized  the
opportunity and proclaimed an independent republic on 17 August 1945. The nationalist
movement  and  this  proclamation  were  ignored  by  the  Dutch.  They  considered  the
nationalists a small  and local minority, that should not be taken seriously.43 The Dutch
established an intelligence service, the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Services (NEFIS),
which was responsible for intelligence gathering in the occupied areas, together with the
Korps Insulinde. The deployment of 'parties' that were sent to the Netherlands East Indies
failed completely, despite the fact that NEFIS was one of the largest departments within
the KNIL in the last war year.44
Allied co-operation during WWII: SEAC
Despite the measures taken by the colonial government, the Netherlands East Indies was
not able to defend itself during the Japanese attack of 1941-1942. The Allied powers in
Southeast  Asia  gathered  in  the  ABDA command,  which  had  the  task  to  protect  the
countries from the attacking Japanese.45 The ABDA command was, just like the KNIL,
unable to carry out this task. Debates about whether the Netherlands East Indies, and in
specific the KNIL, could have had a better defence have been conducted extensively.46
41 Brocades Zaalberg and Willems, "Onmacht, ontkenning en onderschatting", 82.
42 Dennis, Troubled days of peace, 81.
43 De Jong, De terugtocht, 13-16 and 21-22.
44 Dennis,  Troubled days of peace, 73-75; De Moor,  Generaal Spoor, 149;  McTurnan Kahin,  Nationalism
and revolution, 142.
45 The American-British-Dutch-Australian command.
46 A.J.Th. Boester, Nederlands-Indië contra Japan ('s Gravenhage 1949-1961, in 7 parts); H. Bussemaker,
"De geloofwaardigheid van de Indische defensie 1935-1941" in: Militaire Spectator 154 (1985) 163-180;
De Moor,  Generaal  Spoor,  96-100;  G.  Teitler,  De weg terug naar  Indië  1942-1945  (s.l.,  19XX);  H.L.
Zwitzer, "De verdediging van Java bij de Japanse invasie", in: NRC Handelsblad 31 August 1991.
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During  the  war,  tasks  like  fighting  the  Japanese  army,  reconquering  colonies  and
countries, and making plans for when Japan was defeated, were carried out by the British
and the Americans. They divided the Asia-Pacific war theatre into a British part, the South
East Asia Command (SEAC), and an American part, the South West Pacific Area (SWPA).
The  boundaries  between  SEAC  and  SWPA were  changed  on  15  August  1945,  that
coincidentally was the same day as the surrender of Japan. Lord Mountbatten, the British
SEAC  commander,  was  assigned  many  more  areas:  next  to  Burma,  Siam,  Malaya,
Singapore  and Sumatra,  he  was also  assigned the  command of  the  southern  part  of
Indochina and Java.47 Because of these changes, the American army could faster proceed
their island-hopping to Japan instead of reconquering more islands first. Manpower nor
materiel  were  increased  in  the  areas  that  were  assigned  extra  to  Mountbatten.48 The
change of authority was earlier requested by the Dutch government, which hence did not
protest against this decision.49 The Dutch did not see the transfer to SEAC as a negative
move, since the British were considered to be more positive about colonial empires.50
Since the Netherlands East Indies did not have an existing army during the Second
World  War,  the  Dutch  depended on the  British  and Americans  for  military  aid.  In  the
Netherlands East Indies, it was SEAC that had the task to take over authority from the
Japanese occupiers. SEAC was primarily a military organisation. For liberation, recovery,
and  medical  care  of  the  135,000  POWs in  the  SEAC areas,  the  Recovery  of  Allied
Prisoners of War and Internees (RAPWI) was established. This organisation could start its
activities from 28 August 1945, when it was granted that the local Japanese commanders
would follow the orders to surrender.51 RAPWI's activities were the most successful of all
Mountbatten's tasks, especially for the recovery of POWs. This was in stark contrast to the
recovery of IFTU's in the Netherlands East Indies, when Mountbatten's forces were unable
to protect (Indo-)Dutch civilians during the Bersiap.
To co-ordinate the recovery teams for both civilians and POWs, the Netherlands
East Indies government in Australia established the Kantoor Dislocated Persons (KDP) on
12 July  1945.  Also  erected was the  Netherlands  Indies  Civil  Administration  (NICA),  a
civilian but militarised organisation, that was responsible for all civilian tasks concerning
the liberation of the Netherlands East Indies. It worked together with the American Sixth
47 NIB I, no. 21.
48 Dennis, Troubled days of peace, 5-6.
49 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 50.
50 Teitler, De weg terug, 98-99.
51 Touwen-Bouwsma and Groen, "Van Banzai tot Bersiap", 22.
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Army command.52 It was originally established to take over colonial administration directly
after the Americans had liberated islands in the archipelago, but this plan could not be
effectuated because of the change of SEAC/SWPA areas on 15 August.53 It only consisted
of  no  more  than  500  employees  mid-1945,  thus  making  it  not  a  very  powerful
organisation.54
The  colonial  government-in-exile  sent  liaison  officers  to  SEAC  offices  to  make
communication and co-operation easier. This Dutch liaison mission was fulfilled by KNIL
Colonel  D.C. Buurman van Vreeden. The SEAC headquarters were first  in New Delhi,
India, but were moved to Kandy, Ceylon, in July 1944. As a part of SEAC, the Allied Land
Forces South East Asia (ALFSEA) were founded in 1944. Other high-ranking KNIL officers
were appointed as liaison officers to these headquarters,  that  were in Singapore.  The
Dutch  mission  to  this  office  was  located  in  Changi,  near  Singapore.55 Buurman  van
Vreeden had to report to Lieutenant-Admiral Helfrich in Colombo. They maintained regular
contact, also with other KNIL staff members and colonial administrators in Australia. From
1944,  Buurman van  Vreeden  regularly  wrote  memoranda  about  the  Netherlands  East
Indies, such as one to inform the British about the Netherlands East Indies and its military
strategic important places, and various other ones with his visions for the future colonial
armed forces. He sent these memoranda to Helfrich for discussion.56
Helfrich's function as commander-in-chief of  the Netherlands Eastern forces was
only an administrative one. In practice, the few Dutch forces that survived the Japanese
attack fell  under the command of  SEAC or SWPA. The political-diplomatic  side of  the
Dutch government-in-exile was assigned to the Lieutenant Governor-General.  Between
1942 and 1945, Van Mook was occupied with maintaining diplomatic relationships with
Great Britain and the United States. The latter would, until 15 August 1945, play the most
important role for the Netherlands East Indies. Van Mook had thus focused on gaining
American political and military support during his diplomatic visits. He was successful in
this, particularly because of his closeness with American General MacArthur, who was a
supporter of Van Mook's ideas for the Netherlands East Indies.57 They shared the same
52 Van den Berge, H.J. van Mook, 186-187.
53 Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 48-52.
54 Brocades Zaalberg and Willems, "Onmacht, ontkenning en onderschatting", 65.
55 National Archive, The Hague, Nederlands Liaison Officier at the General Headquarters in New Delhi and
the Nederlands East Indies Mission at the Headquarters Allied Land Forces South East Asia, 1942-1946,
entry number 2.13.130, inventory introduction.
56 National Archive, The Hague, Collection 177 D.C. Buurman van Vreeden, entry number 2.21.036.02,
inventory numbers 8 and 9 contain various memoranda about the Buurman van Vreeden's visions on the
future of the colonial army and the strategy for rebuilding the army [May-October 1945].
57 Van den Berge, H.J. van Mook, 192-195.
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views on how the Allies should fight the Pacific War, and what role the Netherlands East
Indies played in this. Van Mook on the one hand preferred to leave the fighting to the
Americans, and to let the Netherlands East Indies focus on restoration of the colonial rule
using civil forces, not military.58 Helfrich on the other hand wanted the Dutch to participate
in defeating Japan, and preferred the KNIL and Navy to play a role in the fighting, instead
of leaving the colonial restoration to NICA. This will be further discussed in chapter 2.59
After the transfer of the command over the Netherlands East Indies from SWPA to SEAC,
Van Mook had to  collaborate  with  Lord  Mountbatten,  with  whom he did  not  have the
friendly relationship as he had shared with MacArthur.
Dutch-British disagreements
Before Van Mook and other colonial officials, like Ch.O. van der Plas, head of the colonial
internal administration (BB,  Binnenlands Bestuur) arrived in the Netherlands East Indies
early September 1945, none of them had imagined how the situation was on Java and
Sumatra, political and military, as well as the living conditions for everyone. Intelligence
agencies that were responsible for information gathering in the occupied areas had not
been successful, neither had they achieved anything meaningful after the surrender. The
Dutch in Australia only heard the news about the proclamation of independence two days
after the happening on 17 August 1945, and they did not take this news seriously at all.
Van Mook  and  Helfrich,  together  with  their  British  colleagues,  regarded  the  Republik
Indonesia as a Japanese creation, that did not have a large support among the people.60
Indonesian  youth  movements  had  indeed  worked  together  with  the  Japanese  armed
forces  in  order  to  be  able  to  proclaim  independence,  but  the  Indonesians  acted
autonomous in actually proclaiming independence.  The nationalist  movement even put
thought in how to handle Christian minorities to prevent them from going to support the
returning  Dutch.61 Van Mook made other  mistakes too.  In  his  radio  speech  for  Radio
Melbourne on 15 August, he underestimated the situation of the interned (Indo-)Dutch, but
he was quickly  corrected about  this  by Mountbatten.62 After some other  Dutch military
58 De Moor, Generaal Spoor, 146; G. Teitler, Vlootvoogd in de knel. Vice-admiraal Pinke tussen marinestaf,
Indië en de Indonesische revolutie (Assen 1990) 19.
59 De Moor, Generaal Spoor, 108, Teitler, Vlootvoogd, 19
60 NIB I, no. 49; Touwen-Bouwsma and Groen, Van Banzai tot Bersiap, 14; National Archive, The Hague,
Nederlands Liaison Officier at the General Headquarters in New Delhi and the Nederlands East Indies
Mission at the Headquarters Allied Land Forces South East Asia, 1942-1946, entry number 2.13.130,
inventory number 32:  Letter  081537 from ALFSEA to SACSEA, about the relationship between local
Japanese forces and Indonesian nationalists on Java [s.d., September 1945].
61 Anderson, Java in a time of revolution, 65-66 and 87-88.
62 Van den Berge, H.J. van Mook, 200-201.
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personnel  had  arrived  on  Java  in  late  September  1945,  they  still  did  not  assess  the
political situation correctly.63 
The Dutch were in general very unsatisfied by the small amount of help the British
seemed to offer concerning the military situation in the Netherlands East Indies, while Lord
Mountbatten thought the political situations on Java and in Burma seemed similar, and
needed similar treatment.64 Next to this Dutch disappointment, Dennis analysed that the
Dutch were very much unprepared for the time when the war was over, and how they
underestimated the amount of  work and people it  would cost  to re-occupy the colony.
"Ignorance and self-delusion were a potent mixture, and the Dutch were yet to appreciate
the enormity of the situation facing them and the limits of their own power", Dennis wrote
in his judgement of the Dutch attitude.65
The number of soldiers that had continued working for the colonial army in Australia
had  grown  to  around  5,000  soldiers  in  the  summer  of  1945.  How this  increase  was
reached, is further handled in chapter 3. Because of this amount of soldiers that the KNIL
consisted  of,  the  organisational  structure  of  the  KNIL managed  to  survived the  war.66
Major-General W. Schilling was one of the first KNIL commanders that returned to Java, on
board  of  a  British  ship  that  arrived  there  on  29  September  1945.  He  became  the
commander  of  a  contingent  of  KNIL  soldiers  south  of  Batavia  (Jakarta).  Dutch  and
Moluccan soldiers who had recently arrived, or were released from their camps, formed
provisional army units. These forces, and other groups, acted provocatively against British
and  Indonesian  Republicans.  Skirmishes  between  Indonesians  and  KNIL  soldiers  in
September and October, the following Battle of Surabaya, and the outbreak of the Bersiap
made first Mountbatten decide to only occupy key areas (cities) as safe havens on 29
September.67  Mountbatten  based this  decision  also  on more  accurate  information  he
received his  wife  Lady Edwina,  who had visited Java and Sumatra  in  a  humanitarian
worker position, and Laurens van der Post, who was a British intelligence officer in the
Netherlands East Indies. According to them, the nationalists developed into a powerful
organisation,  and had an army initiated by  the Japanese.  Mountbatten's  decision  was
followed by General  P. Christison's decision to not allow Dutch troops to return to the
Netherlands East Indies for the time being. These changes yielded Mountbatten much
criticism from both the Foreign Office and the War Office back in London. They thought
63 Groen, Marsroutes en dwaalsporen, 17.
64 Dennis, Troubled days of peace, 95.
65 Idem, 73.
66 Elands, "Strijd, opheffing en erfenis", 22-23.
67 De Jong, De terugtocht, 26.
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Mountbatten was losing grip on the evolution of the conflictuous situation on Java, they
were however also unable to come up with a better plan or advice.68 The changes that
took place in October 1945 are further discussed in chapter 3. 
It  took  time  and  persuasion,  but  eventually  Mountbatten  forced  Van  Mook  to
negotiate with the Indonesian nationalists, in exchange for a British promise to send more
troops  to  Java.  Van der  Plas  had  already  considered  this  option.69 The  British  solely
recognised Dutch sovereignty over the archipelago, and Van Mook agreed to meet with
Sukarno  and  his  followers.70 This  led  to  a  meeting  between  the  two,  and  other
Republicans, on 31 October 1945. Prime Minister Schermerhorn and his ministers had
prohibited Van Mook to meet Sukarno, whom they regarded as a collaborator, communist
and Japanese puppet politician.71 The Dutch government found Van Mook's actions were
unacceptable. Queen Wilhelmina however refused to fire Van Mook, because it would be
'incorrect to change commanders in the middle of ongoing struggles', and she wanted to
restore  colonial  rule  first.72 Politicians  in  The  Hague  and  in  Southeast  Asia  stood  on
opposite sides when it came to how the situation in the Netherlands East Indies should be
handled. The Dutch had lost control and self-determination when it came to deciding how
to solve the problems they encountered on Java and Sumatra, not only with the newly
proclaimed Republic, but also other cases, like the Bersiap and the situation of POWs.
Prisoners of war
Different numbers on how many KNIL soldiers were imprisoned during the war appear in
the sources. Generally, it is assumed that Zwitzer's research is most correct, and that the
KNIL consisted of a little over 120,000 soldiers in 1942. Around 45,000 of this number
were  Europeans.  The Netherlands Indies  Red Cross estimated  in  February  1945 that
13,050  Dutch  POWs  were  situated  in  camps  outside  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  in
February 1945. An additional 658 soldiers deceased before that time, which would make
the total  of  POWs outside  the  archipelago almost  14,000.73 These numbers  were not
68 Bussemaker,  Bersiap!, 112; Dennis,  Troubled days of peace, 137;  McMillan,  The British occupation of
Indonesia, 85-87.
69 NL-HaNA, Dutch Liaison Missions to GHQ and ALFSEA, 2.13.130, inv.no. 56: Report of a meeting with
a.o. Van der Plas present [30 September 1945].
70 Van den Berge, H.J. van Mook, 206-207; Dennis, Troubled days of peace, 139; De Jong, Koninkrijk 11c,
621.
71 De Jong, Koninkrijk 11c, 634.
72 Van den Berge, H.J. van Mook, 206-207.
73 National Archive, The Hague, Ministry of Colonies in London, entry number 2.10.45, inventory number
279: Information from the Netherlands Indies Red Cross Society in Melbourne about POWs in Japanese
imprisonment [7 February 1945].
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estimated correctly. The post-war paperwork mentions around 11,000 POWs in Siam and
6,700 in Manilla74 of a total of 38,386 Dutch KNIL soldiers that was imprisoned. Around
8,200 of that number died.75 For the re-establishment of the KNIL, it is important to know
how many Indonesian (in Dutch literature often called indigenous or native) and Dutch
POWs and free soldiers were present where and when, but it still seems very difficult to
establish exact and correct numbers from both literature and archival sources. The Dutch
colonial administrators had made plans that former POWs and internees who needed it,
could stay in mountain resorts on Java and Sumatra for their recovery. NICA wanted the
estimated  number  of  around  25,000  men  in  Burma,  Siam,  Indochina  and  Japan  to
repatriate  as  quickly  as  possible  to  re-enter  military  service.  Repatriation  to  the
Netherlands was by all  means out of the question. It  was after all  the expectation that
colonial rule would soon be re-established.76
The Allies arranged that each country or colonial power would send liaison teams to
areas where their citizens were expected to be after the Japanese surrender. The Dutch
failed to do so because of personnel shortages and haziness concerning the transfer of
command from SWPA to SEAC.77 In the American areas, relief of the POWs went quite
smoothly. Around 6,700 Dutch former POWs were gathered in American camps in Manila,
the capital  of  the Philippines. They could not stay there for long,  since the Americans
needed the space for their  own. From 8 October, these POWs also started to form a
political  risk.  They  organised  themselves  into  army  units  and  told  the  press  that  the
Americans  trained  them to  fight  against  Sukarno.  Since  the  United  States  wanted  to
remain impartial for the time being, they insisted on repatriating these former POWs to the
Netherlands East Indies.78 How this situation further developed is discussed in chapter 3.
Because of Christison's decision to not allow more Dutch forces to return to Java,
Dutch former POWs were forced to wait in transit camps in Bangkok and Singapore, while
they anxiously waited for news about the safety of their families back home.79 Around two-
74 NL-HaNA, Dutch Liaison Missions to GHQ and ALFSEA, 2.13.130, inv.no. 60: Letter from Weijerman,
NICA, to Headquarters of Dislocated Persons, part of the Netherlands East Indies government, Brisbane,
Australia [25 September 1945];  National Archive,  The Hague, Netherland Forces Intelligence Service
[NEFIS]  and Central  Military  Intelligence service [CMI]  in  the Netherlands East  Indies,  entry  number
2.10.62, inventory number 2300: letter from Captain Egelie, HQ Batavia [4 December 1945].
75 P.M.H. Groen,  "Japanse krijgsgevangenschap.  Niemand heeft  iets aan mythes die  nieuwe, onzekere
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Wereldoorlog en sindsdien (Amsterdam 2015) 20-25, there 20; Zwitzer and Heshusius,  Het KNIL, 158-
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third of Dutch POWs stranded outside the Netherlands East Indies, squeezed between a
finished world war and a beginning revolution.80 In the Bangkok area, about 11,000 Dutch
POWs were gathered, and a part of them was trained to go back into military service. 81
This is also further discussed in chapter 3.
Unlike  the British,  who got  assigned the  Netherlands East  Indies  in  SEAC, the
Americans  were  not  that  much  interested  in  the  political  and  military  situation  in  the
Netherlands East Indies. In summer 1945, the American media paid little attention to news
about  the  Indonesian  independence  proclamation.82 The  Americans  did  support  the
Netherlands  financially  and  military  in  reconquering  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  from
summer  1945.  Around  4,500  Dutch  Marines  were  trained  in  Camp  Lejeune  (North
Carolina) by the U.S. Marine Corps during the Second World War. In October 1945, these
trained and equipped marines left for the Netherlands East Indies, where they played an
important role in the transfer of Surabaya from the British to the Dutch. 83 The Americans
also  supplied  materiel,  such  as  uniforms,  arms  and  jeeps  to  Dutch  forces  in  the
Netherlands East Indies. Until 1948, the Americans did not oppose restoration of Dutch
colonial  rule  in  the  archipelago.  Before  the  'Second  Police  Action',  American  loyalties
transferred to the Indonesian Republic. This happened because of Cold War strategies
and the Indonesian reaction to the Madiun revolt in September 1948, when the Republic
demonstrated an anti-communist attitude.84
Conclusion
In this chapter, the international context of the Asia-Pacific war theatre is laid out. The
British  and  Americans  had  divided  it  into  two  areas,  and  consequently  SEAC  was
responsible for temporarily taking over power from the Japanese. In the Netherlands East
Indies,  a  nationalist  movement  had  grown  during  the  war.  Violent  groups  of pemuda
encountered newly formed KNIL units, that consisted of Dutch and Moluccan soldiers, in
September  and  October  1945.  This  and  other  happenings  made  Mountbatten  and
Christison decide to not allow more Dutch armed forces to the Netherlands East Indies.
80 Groen, "Prisoners of war", 52-53.
81 NL-HaNA, NEFIS and CMI, 2.10.62, inv.no. 2300: letter from Captain Egelie, General Headquarters [4
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1946].
82 F. Gouda and T. Brocades Zaalberg,  American visions of  the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia.  US
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Therefore, former POWs were forced to wait in transit camps in areas around Bangkok,
Singapore  and  Manila.  The Dutch  had  not  foreseen  any  of  these  developments,  and
ignored the nationalist movement in particular.
23
24
Chapter 2: Planning from 1942 until 15 August 1945
Introduction
The Dutch  colonies  experienced  a  chaotic  Second  World  War.  The  Netherlands  East
Indies was occupied by Japanese forces, Dutch citizens and subjects were interned and
colonial soldiers were captured and used as forced labourers. The colonial authorities fled
to  British  soil,  the  military  divided between  Australia  and  Ceylon,  while  the  politicians
settled  in  Brisbane,  Australia.  The  Dutch  government  had  already  left  The  Hague  for
London  in  May  1940,  where  Prime  Minister  Gerbrandy  led  a  wartime  cabinet.  Two
ministers  had  a  dual  position,  and  also  worked  for  the  Netherlands  East  Indies
government-in-exile: Van Mook and his Navy colleague J.Th. Furstner. Preparations for
the Dutch return to the Netherlands East Indies were made during the Second World War.
These were not only focused on restoration of Dutch colonial rule in the Netherlands East
Indies, but some Dutch leaders also wanted Dutch forces to actively participate in the war
against  Japan.  The  KNIL  was  central  to  many  of  these  plans.  In  this  chapter,  the
preparations that were made concerning the colonial army until the Japanese surrender
are studied. The Dutch made these plans without extensive knowledge on the changes
that  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  had  gone  through  during  the  Japanese  occupation.
Opposing views about what role the Dutch should take up are analysed, next the Dutch
connections with the Allies, then the plans in 1942-1943, 1944 and finally the first eight
months  of  1945  are  discussed.  It  is  important  to  know  how  the  Dutch  approach  in
developing these plans was, since it reflects how they thought re-colonisation would work
out after the Second World War.
Opposing views
Different opinions on how the Dutch should return to the Netherlands East Indies not only
existed between the Americans and the British, as is already discussed in the first chapter,
differences also existed among Dutch leaders. At first, most Dutch colonial leaders like
Helfrich, Van Mook and Van der Plas assumed that they could easily return to their pre-war
positions and continue their political authority.85 Both the Dutch and the British had not
expected that the situation had changed that much. Therefore, they had not put extensive
thought in preparing for a situation where they would not be welcomed back with open
85 Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, American visions, 138.
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arms.86 This yields a difficult situation: the Dutch could have prepared their return better, if
they would have had more information about the wartime developments in the archipelago.
They however did not have a functional intelligence service that was able to provide this
information. Could they also have planned better whilst not having this intelligence? This
kind of 'what if' historical thinking provides a different perspective to the Dutch situation
between 1942 and 1946. The Dutch assumed that they could return to the Netherlands
East Indies without a fight, after the surrender of the Japanese army. This idea can be
considered naive, or as a sort of colonial hubris. The Dutch had a self-evident attitude, that
is reflected in their relationship with their colonies. The Dutch approached their colonial
rule in the Netherlands East Indies as something naturally, something they were entitled to
have, even after the Japanese occupation that lasted for three and a half years.
The Dutch preparations on how they would return to the colony and restore colonial
authority focused on how to do this using armed forces. During the Second World War, the
Dutch  armed  forces  had  already  accepted  that  restoration  of  colonial  rule  in  the
Netherlands East Indies on their own would be impossible, and that alliances with Great
Britain and the United States would be necessary. The focus was on Great Britain, which
had the largest and most powerful colonial empire in Asia, and the United States, which
were  occupied with  their  march to  Japan.  Each  country  had its  own colonial  political
priorities: the United States advocated for independent Asian countries, and was in this
respect less preferred by the Dutch, while Great Britain, like the Netherlands, wanted to re-
establish its colonial empire. The French empire was in more or less the same dependent
position as the Netherlands.87
During the Second World War, Dutch leaders had opposing views about how to
handle the colonial situation. Army officers on the one hand, like Helfrich, Buurman van
Vreeden and S.H. Spoor, head of NEFIS, wanted the colonial army to play a large role in
the restoration of colonial authority during a time of Military Authority. Van Mook on the
other hand preferred NICA to carry out the task of colonial restoration. Neither van Mook,
nor Van der Plas and other administrators were army-minded.88 One point on which all
colonial  leaders,  both  political  and  military,  agreed,  was  the  instability  of  the  political
decisions that were made by The Hague government. The government wanted to decide
on Indische affairs, instead of allowing the colonial administrators to determine what was
best for the colony. This is obvious in a number of cases: Van Mook had to find a balance
86 Dennis, Troubled days of peace, 73-76, 83-87; McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and revolution, 142.
87 Teitler, De weg terug naar Indië, 1-7.
88 De Moor, Generaal Spoor, 163; Teitler, De weg terug naar Indië, 112.
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between his feeling that he was counterworked by the ignorant Hague politicians, and the
Indonesian  nationalist  movement.89 Helfrich  thought  that  there  were  too  many  Hague
politicians involved in deciding on Indische affairs, and that they did not want to enlarge
the power of the colonial  army leaders. The Navy and KNIL however had never been
closer in co-operating than during the preparations for the end of the Second World War.
Helfrich's  view of the unstable Dutch politics was also formed because of  doubts and
ignorance the Hague politicians showed in deciding about army enlargement and military
training.90
Ties with the Allies
After the government's flight to Australia in March 1942, Helfrich appointed Buurman van
Vreeden,  who  used  to  work  at  the  General  Headquarters  of  the  KNIL  in  Bandung,
Netherlands Liaison Officer at the General Headquarters of the India Command in New
Delhi. His tasks covered all military matters, first and foremost as a liaison officer between
the BSO and the General HQ, but he also had to collect information and intelligence about
British strategies from India and Ceylon during the war. Other tasks included collecting
intelligence on the movements of enemy forces and pass this information on to the BSO.91
In November 1943, Buurman van Vreeden was also appointed liaison officer at the SEAC
headquarters,  where Lord Mountbatten held office.  His third position was as a military
attaché at the Dutch Embassy in Chungking, China.92 That fact that Buurman van Vreeden
held  three  positions  at  the  same  time  was  sometimes  seen  as  a  problem  by  his
colleagues. In early 1944, objections were raised against his dual positions in New Delhi
and Chungking, because of the limited time he could devote to these two tasks.93 
The Netherlands had a permanent military representation at the Combined Chiefs of
Staff (CCS), the supreme Allied war command in Washington. This delegation served the
interests of the all parts of the Dutch army, although KL and Navy were the only ones who
had representatives in this delegation.94 Before the Second World War, the responsibilities
89 Teitler, De weg terug naar Indië, 119; Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, American visions, 138.
90 Teitler, De weg terug naar Indië, 119-121.
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over different armies lied with different Ministries. The Ministry of Navy was responsible for
the Royal Navy worldwide, also including the Navy in all colonies. The Minister of Warfare
was responsible for the Royal Army (KL) and the colonial army fell under responsibility of
the  Minister  of  Colonies.  This  division  could  decision-making  difficult,  especially  in
situations of occupation. The representatives in Washington only represented the 'Dutch'
armies, thus Navy and Royal Army, and not the colonial army. The KNIL was supposed to
be represented by the other two. The representatives in Washington complained with the
Minister of Warfare that their tasks were complicated, due to the fact that the Americans
did not trust them with information.95 It is therefore questionable how much work they were
able to do.
Despite  the  government's  refusal  to  add  a  KNIL  member  to  the  military
representation,  the  colonial  army  sent  a  military  attaché  to  the  Dutch  Embassy  in
Washington, Colonel F.G.L. Weyerman. He served as a liaison officer between the Dutch
in the United States and the KNIL leaders. Weyerman was extremely annoyed by the fact
that he was not added to the Netherlands Representation to the CCS. The only way he
was able to influence the two Dutch delegates at the CSS was through Van Mook, who, as
Minister of Colonies, was his military superior. Van Mook was even more annoyed by the
situation that the KNIL was not directly represented in Washington. Since the KNIL did not
have  a  direct  representative,  it  was  unable  to  influence  the  CCS's  decisions  on  the
Netherlands East Indies. The KL and Navy delegates were, in Van Mook and Weyerman's
eyes, unable to carry out this task as they wished.96
In 1945, Weyerman was transferred to NICA, where he became chief staff officer in
Ceylon. In this position, his contact with Van Mook continued. His job included serving as a
liaison officer between Van Mook and RAPWI. He was also involved in meetings with Van
Mook with  Lord Mountbatten,  where the proclamation of  the Indonesian Republic  was
discussed, and the British reaction to that.97 To Lord Mountbatten's disappointment, NICA
and thus also Weyerman fell under the command of Van Mook, not the BSO. The division
between army commanders and civil  administrators complicated the Dutch relationship
Indies according to De Jong, Het Koninkrijk. Deel 9 I, 304-305. 
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with SEAC.98
During the Second World War, Van Mook travelled the world in his dual position as
Minister of Colonies and Lieutenant-Governor-General. He frequented the United States to
maintain contact with military and political leaders in Washington D.C. and New York. He
developed a close relationship with SWPA commander MacArthur during the war, when
they worked together on the planning how the American liberation of the Netherlands East
Indies would take place, and how NICA would carry out the civil affairs directly after the
American progress.99 Van Mook preferred, as is discussed in chapter 1, to work together
with the Americans. This way, the Dutch would not actively participate in the war against
Japan, but contribute in the form of a temporary civil  authority, that is to say NICA, to
restore Dutch rule in the areas after they would be liberated by American forces.100
Plans in 1942-1944
Already  in  1942,  the  Dutch  government-in-exile  in  London  started  to  make  plans  to
establish  several  armed  forces  to  send  overseas  to  fight  against  Japan,  after  the
Netherlands had been liberated. It was expected that this liberation would take place in
1944, and that re-establishment of the army could start beforehand. Van Mook was at first
not  informed about these plans, despite the fact that he was the Minister of  Colonies.
These plans could influence the existence of the KNIL, but he was only informed about
these until  at a later stage, with the excuse that they were Navy plans and thus were
another Minister's responsibility. At the same time, the KNIL branches that had gone into
exile in Australia also discussed long-term plans for when the war was over. Spoor's plans
for the colonial armed forces focused on co-operation between KNIL and Navy, and also
included deployment of more local Indonesian soldiers. He did not want the KNIL to play a
role in the liberation of the Netherlands East Indies, but preferred the available soldiers in
Australia to serve as intelligence and liaison officers.101
The  year  1943  can  be  characterised  as  the  year  of  severe  discussions  about
military preparations. The Dutch foresaw the possibility that a power vacuum would occur
after the Japanese surrender, and started to anticipate for when this would be the case.
98 National  Archive,  The  Hague,  Ministry  of  the  Navy:  Personal  archive  of  Lieutenant-Admiral  C.E.L.
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Opinions about the military solution for a possible power vacuum were various.102 The two
different plans for the Dutch forces are explained here, each with their own supporters. 
The Navy was the first to launch plans about a new army, which would be a Marine
force.  A Marine Corps (Mariniersbrigade)  would be erected,  which would serve as the
Dutch  contribution  in  the  Allied  war  against  Japan.  Navy  Minister  Furstner  strongly
supported this plan. Van Mook however preferred a strategy of leaving liberation of the
colonies to the Americans. In his reasoning, the Marine Corps would not be needed, since
this force would only be useful for fighting against Japan. Peace and order troops would be
much more useful for restoration of colonial rule, and thus time and effort must be put in
restoration of the KNIL. The Navy criticised the KNIL that the KNIL did not have enough
power to be able to support American troops after they had reconquered the Netherlands
East Indies.103
The Ministers of Colonies and the Navy were not the only ones who stood opposite
each other about the plans which armed forces needed increasement. In general, Navy
people were supportive of the Marine Corps plan, while supporters of the American side
preferred to use the KNIL. KNIL leaders believed the colonial army was the most suitable
option for restoration of the Dutch rule, due to its long experience with internal violence
and war. The possibility to use the colonial army for this would also mean restoration of the
KNIL's honour, which had been severely damaged because of the defeat  by Japan in
1942.104 The KNIL started to  make plans to  increase its  number  of  soldiers.  After  the
Netherlands  was  liberated,  around  5,500  men  would  be  trained  in  Australia,  by  the
Australian army, and then sent to the Indies, to serve as a liberation force there together
with the Americans.105 The Australian offer would be withdrawn just before the Japanese
surrender, as will be discussed in chapter 3.
Plans from January 1945 until 15 August 1945
Preparations for a Dutch return to the archipelago continued in 1945. Several issues, that
are discussed in the previous chapter, turned out to be difficult. First, the American plans to
reconquer the Netherlands East Indies as a part of the island-hopping strategy up to Japan
was cancelled. Second, the borders of SEAC and SWPA were changed. And third, the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, the highest Allied war command, in Washington decided against
102Teitler, De weg terug naar Indië, 46.
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many Dutch wishes during the war, such as the request to the Americans to train all Dutch
armed forces.106
The Dutch government  decided that  the Marine Corps would be established,  in
order to fight against Japan alongside American troops. The Americans, although anti-
colonial, did not oppose re-establishment of Dutch colonial rule in the Netherlands East
Indies and thus approved of this idea.107 The United States were willing to train Dutch
Marines in their U.S. Marine Corps  Camp Lejeune  in North Carolina. A total of around
4,500 soldiers and 200 officers were trained by Americans into an American system, using
American  equipment.  They  were  professional  soldiers  from  the  Netherlands,  who
managed to avoid capture by the Germans, soldiers from the Caribbean colonies, and war
volunteers recruited in the Netherlands from 1944. This plan was partly developed by the
Dutch representative at the CCS, General-Major A.H.Q. Dijxhoorn.108 Plans for restoration
of the KNIL continued to be developed at the same time. In general, the Dutch were very
focused on how they could deploy as many armed forces as quickly as possible in the
Netherlands East Indies. Different organisations had been erected to help realising this
idea, which consisted of different parts: recovery of POWs, and the erection of different
organisations to facilitate this, recruiting new soldiers, and calling conscripts to the front. 
First, plans to erect a civil-military authority were carried out: the Netherlands Indies
Civil  Administration was established. It  was supposed to become the organisation that
followed the American troops when they had liberated the Netherlands East Indies island
to island and it would re-establish Dutch rule on those islands.109 Some kind of competition
had developed between KNIL and NICA. A memorandum, dated 24 June 1945, in which it
is  analysed  how  military  authorities  managed  Dutch  troops,  partly  focused  on  this
competition  and which  roles  KNIL and NICA would  play  in  the  colonial  liberation  and
reconquest. The Allied commanders expected the Dutch to provide operational forces for
the battle against Japan, while the Dutch thought to use these available soldiers as troops
for peace and order. Also, internal  differences of opinion about the type of forces that
should  be  developed  are  mentioned.  Navy  captain  J.J.L.  Willinge,  author  of  this
memorandum,  criticised  Spoor's  plan  to  institute  Military  Authority,  since  that  would
106Teitler, De weg terug naar Indië, 70-75.
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decrease power of the colonial government.110 This memorandum thus did not solve these
Dutch internal differences.
Second, another main project on how to enlarge the Allied presence in the liberated
areas was planning on how to recover Allied POWs, among them also KNIL soldiers. The
Dutch expected to be able to deploy these soldiers shortly after recovery. The first action
came  from SEAC's  side,  this  was  the  establishment  of  RAPWI.  This  was  erected  to
provide physical care to POWs and other internees. From Spring 1945,  the CCS also
seriously started to put thought in how captured people would be cared for after they were
liberated.  Romusha were  only  then  included  in  the  plans.  In  RAPWI  documents,  no
reference was made however to the romusha's situation or the number of romusha.  For
people from the Netherlands East Indies, the division between SEAC and SWPA meant
that most POWs and civilian internees would be taken care of by RAPWI. RAPWI was
responsible  for  multiple  tasks:  recovery  of  POWs,  intelligence gathering  about  POWs,
informing POWs when the war was over and what they had to do and what they could
expect using leaflets that were dropped from airplanes.111
The Dutch themselves discussed the issue of recovery from January 1945. One of
the organisations erected for this purpose was the Leger Organisatie Centrum (LOC, Army
Organisation Centre) which only consisted of 37 employees in April 1945, whereby it was
not very powerful. It was hoped that fit-for-duty former POWs would fill the gaps on the
spot.112 Only on 12 June, the Kantoor Displaced Persons was erected as a part of NICA,
and its establishment was finalised by endorsement of the Lieutenant-Governor-General
on 28 July 1945. KDP's main tasks were to co-ordinate different administrations, maintain
contact with other organisations, supply goods, evacuation and repatriation. Contact with
RAPWI  was  vital  for  KDP,  as  was  keeping  in  touch  with  the  Red  Cross.  Civilians,
especially women, were asked to work for the (Australian) Red Cross in hospitals and do
other welfare work. The Dutch also sent a KDP liaison officer to RAPWI, Navy Lieutenant
first class W.E. van Genderen.113
110NL-HaNA, Helfrich, 2.12.44, inv.no. 6: Memorandum about the command of the armed forces in the East
and Military Authority by Navy Captain J.J.L. Willinge [24 June 1945].
111NL-HaNA, Liaison Officie HQ New Delhi and South East Asia, 2.13.130, inv.no. 48: Top secret RAPWI
plans concerning how to inform POWs and how many POWs were present in which countries [13 August
1945].
112Touwen-Bouwsma and Groen, "Van Banzai tot Bersiap", 18-19.
113C. Schouten, RAPWI. Geschiedkundig overzicht (s.l., 1947) 3; National Archive, The Hague, Ministry of
the Navy: Navy Commander Australia, until 1943 also Deputy BSO Australië, 1942-1947, entry number
2.12.26, inventory number 53: Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, Kantoor Displaced Persons, "Tasks
of  the  Kantoor  Displaced  Persons"  [12  June  1945].
Van Genderen had previously worked as military liaison officer at the General Headquarters in New Delhi.
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Planning of more armed forces
In June 1945, Buurman van Vreeden published a memorandum on the role of the army in
the  reconquest  of  the  Netherlands  East  Indies.  Then,  the  idea  still  existed  that  the
Netherlands would also provide soldiers for the war against Japan and colonial restoration.
He assumed that  around 5.000 KNIL soldiers would be available,  in addition to about
15.000  KL  conscript  soldiers,  distributed  over  three  divisions.  The  purpose  of  these
soldiers  was  to  use  them  for  maintaining  and/or  recovering  order  in  the  colony,
participating in a small war against Japan, and participate in other Allied fighting. Whether
the Dutch would participate in all these tasks depended on decisions made by the Minister
of Colonies and the army leaders. Although it is unclear from this memorandum whether
the KNIL was supposed to grow in number, it is clearly stated which soldiers would form
the new KNIL: volunteers from the Caribbean colonies, Australian KNIL, former POWs and
newly recruited troops from liberated parts of the Netherlands East Indies. Buurman van
Vreeden clearly stated that the peace and order troops, that would be trained in Australia,
were unsuitable for fighting against Japanese forces. His statement,  that restoration of
military rule would come before maintenance of peace and order, corresponds with Van
Mook's judgment that the Allies would liberate the Netherlands East Indies, and that the
Dutch would only have to follow them and restore Dutch colonial rule.114 
The  Dutch  encountered  another  problem  in  their  aspiration  to  increase  military
forces:  the motherland was liberated 'too late'.  It  had been the expectation that many
soldiers could be recruited from the liberated motherland and that they could be trained
there, and then sent to the Netherlands East Indies to participate in fighting against Japan.
Because of the late liberation in May 1945, there were not enough Dutch soldiers recruited
yet,  and  they  were  untrained.115 Plans  for  a  change  of  constitution,  in  order  to  send
conscript  soldiers  overseas,  were made in  1943.116 In  spring  1946,  the  change to  the
constitution was finalised. Around 100.000 conscript  soldiers would be deployed in the
Netherlands East Indies between 1946 and 1950. The first conscript battalions arrived in
about the appointment of W.E. van Genderen as military liaison officer on 10 June 1944, who had to
report directly to the BSO.
114NL-HaNA, Buurman van Vreeden, 2.21.036.02, inv.no. 8: Memorandum written by Buurman van Vreeden
"Ground forces for the reconquest of the Netherlands East Indies" [14 June 1945]; Teitler, De weg terug
naar Indië, 44-45.
115NL-HaNA, Helfrich, 2.12.44, inv.no. 5: Documents on collaboration with the Allies. Telegram from J.M. de
Booy, Minister of Shipping and Fishery, to Van Kleffens, Minister of Foreign Affairs, about the deployment
of Marines during the planned American liberation of the Netherlands East Indies [15 April 1945].
116National Archive, The Hague, Ministry of War and Defence in London, 1941-1947, entry number 2.13.71,
inventory number 140: No. 13: Draft decision on sending conscripts overseas [1943].
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Batavia on 23 October 1946, and the last army unit of conscript soldiers left Indonesia on
20 February 1951.117
A problem that the KNIL in specific encountered, was recruitment of new soldiers.
Before the Second World War, the KNIL was used to recruit  European soldiers in the
Netherlands, and Indonesian forces joined from all over the archipelago. During the war,
this recruitment was impossible and the government prohibited the army to recruit new
soldiers in liberated or free areas of the Dutch empire, contrary to the Marine Corps, that
was allowed to recruit new members. When the KNIL finally agreed to the establishment of
Naval Forces, like the Marine Corps, together with the Royal Army, this army withdrew its
objections against the KNIL recruiting soldiers in the Netherlands, and the colonial army
was again allowed to recruit new soldiers.118
Another solution the Dutch had for their shortage of military forces, was to recruit
new soldiers in the Netherlands out of resistance members. In summer 1944, the anti-Nazi
resistance was united in the  Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten  (BS, Home Army),  but  these
members were hardly allowed to play a role in liberation of the Netherlands. When the war
in the Netherlands was over, but still going on in the Pacific, members of the BS were
asked to join the armed forces that were sent overseas in order to liberate the Netherlands
East Indies from the Japanese. These  war volunteers would serve within the KL. They
were organised into regional battalions as they were during their resistance time, in for
example 'Bataljon Zeeland' and the 'Fries Bataljon'.119 Before they could be sent overseas,
the war in the Pacific ended. Liberation of the colony was no longer needed, but due to the
political  and military changes in  the Netherlands East Indies,  the war volunteers were
needed to carry out a different task, next to the re-established KNIL: restore peace and
order in the colony. Originally, the plan was to deploy these war volunteers for a year, but
that changed into two years or more. Most of them served in the Netherlands East Indies
until 1948.120 
Conclusion
Between 1942 and 15 August 1945, the Dutch government and the colonial administration,
117Oostindie, Soldaat in Indonesië, 22; "Infanteriebataljons KL", on website Indië 1945-1950. Consulted on
13 March 2016. See: http://www.indie-1945-1950.nl/web/zoek/zoek.htm.
118Teitler, De weg terug naar Indië, 88-93.
119Romijn, "Learning on 'the job'", 320-321.
120NL-HaNA, Armed forces Netherlands East Indies, 2.13.132, inv.no. 1448: letter from Lieutenant-General
Spoor to the Lieutenant-Governor-General, about the replacement of war volunteers and KNIL soldiers
[15 December 1947].
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both in exile, made different plans for the Dutch participation in the Second World War, and
for how to restore colonial rule in the Netherlands East Indies. It is now clear that many of
the  preparations  that  were  made  towards  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  were
developed too late to be effective immediately after the Japanese surrender. At that time,
the  Dutch  prepared  for  a  return  without  a  fight,  which  could  be  considered  naive  or
hubristic. The largest problem between 1942 and 1945 for the Dutch was that they were
forced to adjust their plans because of international decisions about plans for the Pacific
war,  made  by  Americans  and  the  CCS.  The  Dutch  could  do  little  to  influence  these
decisions. Military and civil colonial leaders, and Dutch politicians, who continued to make
plans for restoration of colonial rule, were anything but unanimous about how to do this.
Military commanders disagreed with colonial administrators on how restoration should be
carried out, using NICA – preferred by the colonial administrators – or using armed forces
like the KNIL and Navy, which was preferred by the military commanders. Usually, it was
the Dutch government in exile in London or in The Hague that made the final decisions
about  what  strategy  to  use.  All  colonial  leaders,  both  civil  and  military,  disliked  this
decision-making from the other side of the world. This was a problem that continued to
exist during the Independence War.
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Chapter 3: Outcomes and adjustments. 15 August 1945 until March 1946
Introduction
Because of a number of considerable changes that took place during the Second World
War, after the Japanese surrender and during autumn 1945, the Dutch had to adjust the
plans they had made for restoration of colonial rule and the colonial army. Colonial rule
could not be restored immediately, and expectations how fast the colonial army could be
restored had to be adjusted. In the archipelago, the nationalist movement had proclaimed
the Republik Indonesia. British forces, that arrived late September due to the changes in
SEAC, were unable to control the violent situation in Java and Sumatra. The estimated
number of armed forces needed for restoration of 'peace and order' had to be adjusted.
Also, the number of POWs was higher than expected, and the British military force was
weaker than expected. In this chapter, it is discussed how the Dutch adapted to these
problems between 15 August 1945 and March 1946. From that month, the British allowed
KNIL soldiers, whose physical and mental fitness was worse than the Dutch had hoped,
and war volunteers, to enter the Netherlands East Indies.
Problems for the Dutch
In  the  Netherlands  East  Indies,  a  nationalist  movement  that  existed  since  the  early
twentieth  century  had  grown  during  the  war.  The  Japanese  occupation  had  further
encouraged these nationalist feelings with the Indonesian people. Japanese forces that
occupied the Netherlands East Indies allowed Indonesians to build an army during the war.
Also,  when  the  end  of  the  war  approached,  the  Japanese  military  authorities  invited
Sukarno, Hatta and others who were active in the independence movement to travel to
Singapore to discuss options for the possibility of Indonesian independence. This meeting
took place on 9 August 1945.121 This resulted in the situation where Indonesian nationalists
not only could access trained armed forces, but also that they possessed many arms at
the time of the independence proclamation.122 The Japanese military authorities however
did not support the independence proclamation that was made by Sukarno and Hatta on
121Anderson, Java in a time of revolution, 63.
122H. Bing Siong, "The Indonesian need of arms after the proclamation of independence", Bijdragen tot de
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 157/4 (2001) 799-830, there 799; NL-HaNA, Liaison Officie HQ New Delhi
and South East Asia, 2.13.130, inv.no. 47: Memorandum about the end of the Second World War in the
Netherlands East Indies, mainly about the military situation with Indonesian forces [s.d., 1945].
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17 August 1945.123 Later, the Dutch accused the Japanese army of infringement of the
surrender conditions because they had the idea that the Japanese army collaborated with
the 'Sukarno movement'.124
The  Netherlands,  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  knew  little  about  these
changes in the archipelago. NEFIS had failed during the war, as is discussed in chapter 2.
Because of this failure, Great Britain and the United States also did not have access to
correct intelligence in regard to the nationalist movement in the Netherlands East Indies.125
The Netherlands continued to have a paternalistic view on the colonial empire. The Dutch
wanted their  colony back to  restore faith  in  themselves,  but  above all  to restore their
economy after the Second World War. That is why the First Police Action in 1947 would be
named  'Operation  Product':  the  Dutch  needed  their  colony  for  economic  purposes.126
These superior feelings are visible in a letter that Van Mook sent to the Dutch Ministers of
Colonies, Warfare and Foreign Affairs on 5 October. He reported his thought about that
most Indonesians longed back to the 'old days', especially those in rural areas. He did
recognise that the situation was different than the Dutch had expected. He still thought that
farmers would like the Dutch to return, and that there were more active nationalists among
townsfolk  on  Java  and  Sumatra.127 In  the  first  month  after  the  proclamation  of
independence, most Dutchmen were blind for the changes that had taken place during the
Second World War, not only in nationalism but also in governmental structure that changed
during the Japanese occupation.128
Another problem for the Dutch was that no one had reconquered the Netherlands
East  Indies,  as would happen in a 'normal'  war, and thus there were no Allied forces
present in the archipelago at all. Hence, they had no idea how the Indonesians reacted to
the Japanese who were no longer in power. The possibility of a power vacuum had been
considered, and it was thought that KNIL and/or NICA would be able fill in this gap. 129 In
communication between ALFSEA,  Lord Mountbatten and the Japanese commander  of
Java,  the commander  denied that  the  Japanese forces helped Indonesian nationalists
proclaim independence.  ALFSEA considered the possibility of  internal  unrest  when the
123McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism, 136-137.
124NL-HaNA, Helfrich, 2.12.44, inv.no. 27: Telegram 45/46/47 from Helfrich to the Minister of Warfare [s.d.,
1945].
125Dennis, Troubled days of peace, 75-77; De Moor, Generaal Spoor, 162-163.
126L. Allen, The end of the war in Asia (New York 1979) 82.
127NL-HaNA, Helfrich, 2.12.44, inv.no. 27: Telegram from Van Mook to Ministers Logemann, Schermerhorn
and Van Kleffens, Batavia [5 October 1945].
128Rinzema-Admiraal, Romusha van Java, 84.
129Groen, Marsroutes, 18; McMillan, The British occupation of Indonesia, 11; De Moor, Generaal Spoor, 19;
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British would try to control the situation too efficiently.130 The Dutch, in the person of Van
Mook, accused the Japanese soon that they helped the nationalists in their declaration of
independence.
The  third  problem  that  the  Dutch  encountered  was  the  change  of  war  theatre
borders. It had been earlier decided that SEAC would expand to include the rest of the
Netherlands East Indies and the southern part of Indochina. This expansion was initially
not seen as a negative one by most Dutch officials. The Dutch military leaders like Helfrich
and Buurman van Vreeden preferred to work with the British, as is mentioned in chapter 2.
Van  Mook  however  wanted  to  continue  working  with  the  Americans,  but  the  Dutch
government  ignored  his  protests  and  did  not  do  anything  to  prevent  the  transfer  to
SEAC.131 The Dutch military considered the British a fine ally because they were also an
imperial power, and they were not the anti-colonials the Americans seemed to be. Despite
objections from Van Mook, the actual difficulty did not lie in the fact that the change was
made, but more in the fact that they were only notified shortly before the actual transfer.
The Japanese capitulation came 'too soon' for the Dutch government to prepare for.132
Also,  the  Americans  had  a  more  powerful  army  and  had  better  equipment  than  the
British.133 The  idea  had  been  that  NICA would  follow  the  American  army  when  they
liberated the Netherlands East Indies. Since the British were now assigned the task of
taking over authority from the surrendered Japanese, the Dutch had to change their plans.
Liberation was not necessary anymore after the surrender, hence the idea that NICA would
play the role of temporary civil-military authority had to be altered. That changed into the
idea that the KNIL and the Marine Corps, already shortly discussed in chapter 2, would
carry out the tasks of re-establishing colonial rule.134
The fourth problem that became clear in fall  1945, was the existence of the so-
called Allied shipping pool and mainly shortages in this shared shipping pool. This problem
first occurred in April 1945 and became clear during another problematic situation, namely
one with training and transport of new troops that were recruited in the liberated parts of
the Netherlands. Since 1943, the Dutch had been planning to establish gezagsbataljons
(peace and order battalions). These would be formed in the Netherlands out of men that
130NL-HaNA, Dutch Liaison Missions to GHQ and ALFSEA, 2.13.130, inv.no. 32: Letter from ALFSEA to
SACSEA, [s.d., September 1945].
131Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 65.
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were recruited from the anti-Nazi resistance. After liberation of the Netherlands, they would
be sent to Australia and trained there, an offer the Australian government had made in
1943. In 1943-1944, the Dutch were convinced that they could send between 5,000 and
6,000 soldiers to participate in defeating Japan, after Germany was knocked out.135 When
the Dutch were midst of actually making these plans to ship gezagsbataljons to Australia,
the Combined Chiefs of Staff announced that there were no ships available for such Dutch
troop transports.136 To make matters even worse, the newly appointed Labour government
in Australia pulled back the previous offer to train these Dutch troops in July 1945.137 In
September 1945, the Australian government also did not interfere in strikes that Australian
labour  unions  organised  to  support  Indonesian  workers  who  sympathised  with  the
independence movement. Because of the support of the Waterside Workers Federation,
one of the most important unions, a full blockade of Dutch ships enlarged the problems for
the re-establishment of the KNIL. Australian support for the Indonesian cause commenced
during this time, while the support for the Dutch colonial attitude diminished.138
These problems created a difficult situation for the Dutch, before they even arrived
in the Netherlands East Indies in early September. The political  situation on Java and
Sumatra above all formed the main problem, that was increased due to the absence of
Allied forces in the Netherlands East Indies during the surrender. The change to SEAC
and  the  Australian  refusal  to  train  Dutch  troops  caused  Dutch  feelings  of  being
counterworked  in  their  attempts  to  restore  colonial  rule.  Dutch  troops  were  largely
unavailable  due  to  their  imprisonment  in  Asia,  shipping  for  their  repatriation  to  the
Netherlands East Indies was impeded due to the Allied shipping pool, nor was shipping
new troops from the Netherlands possible in that early stage.
The British and Dutch would soon discover how the political situation actually was in
the  Netherlands  East  Indies.  Since  Lord  Mountbatten  was  not  allowed  to  enter  the
Netherlands East Indies before the official surrender was signed on 2 September, the first
arrival  of  British officers was on 8 September, when a RAPWI team of  four  men was
dropped in the Batavia area. This team reported to Mountbatten that they did not foresee
any problems in  re-establishing colonial  rule.139 This  corresponds with  intelligence that
135NL-HaNA, Navy representative Washington, 2.12.36, inv.no. 37: Planning of the 'gezagsbataljons' made
in  1943;  NL-HaNA,  Dutch  Liaison  Missions  to  GHQ  and  ALFSEA,  2.13.130,  inv.no.  23:  About  the
'gezagsbataljons' that would be trained according to British methods and with British equipment.
136De Moor, Generaal Spoor, 157;
137NIB I, 3.
138Bussemaker, Bersiap!, 65-66.
139Dennis, Troubled days of peace, 83.
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Mountbatten received from the Dutch in Brisbane. He was informed that there might be
some opposition to the Dutch return by around 40,000 armed nationalists on Java, but that
besides this group, nationalist feelings were not strong or widespread. Also, he had not
received any intelligence from SWPA, on which he could base his strategies.140
This view changed soon. A week later, on 15 September, RAPWI staff arrived on
board HMS Cumberland in Tandjoeng Priok, Batavia's port. Slowly, more RAPWI teams
were  dropped  in  Javanese  cities  during  September.141 Since  RAPWI  teams  were  not
intended for intelligence gathering on the nationalist  movement,  military personnel  that
arrived from 15 September only then realised how the situation was different than they had
expected:  Japan  seemed to  have surrendered to  the  Indonesian  Republic,  not  to  the
Allies.142 When the end of September approached, the British started to realise the severity
of the situation and the political and military problems that existed on Java and Sumatra.
New information came on the 28 September from Lady Edwina Mountbatten, who had
made a tour along recovery camps in Sumatra and Java, and informed her husband about
the immense changes that had taken place in the Netherlands East Indies in the past four
years.  The  Dutch  however  brushed  these  objections  aside.143 In  general,  the  Dutch
strongly underestimated the severity of the situation.144 Later, General Philip Christison,
commander of British forces in the Netherlands East Indies, blamed Helfrich, Van der Plas
and Van Oyen for providing him wrong intelligence on the nationalist movement.145 It was
not until the end of October 1945 before the Dutch realised that the political situation was
different than they expected, and discussions with the Indonesians were necessary, which
is discussed below.
KNIL soldiers re-organised themselves
When the colonial government had gone into exile in 1942, the number of KNIL soldiers
that went to Australia was around 1,000. In the summer of 1945, this number had grown to
around 5,000,  due to  additions from the Dutch  Caribbean colonies,  new recruits  from
Surinam, and some female volunteers.146 The first KNIL battalion assisted Australian forces
in their reconquest of Balikpapan, Borneo. This took place in June and July 1945.147 The
140Allen, The end of the war, 83-84.
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KNIL itself played a very minor role in the liberation of the Netherlands East Indies, but
would play a large role in the Indonesian Independence War. The Dutch colonial leaders
also put thought in how the KNIL would be different after the Second World War. Buurman
van Vreeden dedicated several  memoranda to  what  choices the  colonial  army should
make  in  case  of  a  new war.  This  included  the  choice  for  British  armature,  and  also
included major changes in the army command. Wartime developments like imprisonment
of  a  large  number  of  soldiers  have  changed  the  KNIL  heavily,  but  that  was  not
considered.148
In  anticipation  of  the  post-war  situation,  the  Dutch  in  Australia  had  not  only
established NICA, but also LOC and KDP, as are mentioned in the second chapter. LOC’s
task  was  to  take  care,  train  and  re-organise  POWs  as  soon  as  possible  after  their
liberation. For this purpose, it  opened offices in liberated areas around Asia.149 Civilian
internees would be taken care of by KDP. This office was responsible for all war internees
except  personnel  from KNIL or  Navy, since LOC had to  take care of  them.150 Zwitzer
assumes LOC was a busy organisation, due to the large numbers of POWs around Asia,
but  Touwen-Bouwsma  and  Groen  criticise  the  small  number  of  personnel  these
organisations had. During the war, the colonial government had the expectation that these
organisations could recruit more employees from the former POWs and civilian internees.
The actual situation turned out to be very different, since most Dutch internees and POWs
were  in  no  physical  condition  to  work  after  the  war.  Therefore,  these  organisations
‘competed’ over the healthy people that they wanted to recruit as new staff members. 151
Shortly after the Japanese surrender, authority of the prisoner camps around Asia
was  overtaken  by  the  POWs  themselves.  Allies  reached  them  via  leaflets  that  were
dropped from airplanes. The POWs received food packages from the Red Cross in the
same way.152 Quickly,  these  POWs organised  themselves  into  interest  groups,  with  a
'commander', usually the senior officer in command. Also, they contacted Allied powers to
inform them where they were located and that they wanted to be rescued. In these camps,
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these interest groups turned into provisional  army units.153 Some groups of KNIL even
announced that they were ready to repatriate and fight.154 More about this topic will be
discussed in chapter 4.
The first group of POWs that caught the eye of Dutch officials is a medium-sized
group of former POWs that gathered in Singapore already in September 1945. This group
was repeatedly the topic of telegrams, as it was the first large group to collectively decide
that it wanted to form an army unit again. In an undated telegram, probably sent early
September, Buurman van Vreeden requested his colleagues in Singapore and Bangkok,
who recently arrived there, to allow former POWs who are "physically and mentally fit" to
be organised in infantry units and to exercise.155 Around 1.000 Dutch KNIL soldiers were
considered fit for duty and organised into some military structure in Singapore from 15
September 1945 onwards.156 Admiral Helfrich, then present in Melbourne, suggested to
Lord Mountbatten that these soldiers could be transferred to Java, not to do RAPWI work
but  to  be  used  as  regular  military  or  police  personnel.  NICA chief  staff  officer  F.G.L.
Weijerman supported this request, as did Lieutenant-General L.H. van Oyen, commander
of the colonial army in Australia.  Officers and NCO's would be appointed from the group
itself.157 Buurman  van  Vreeden  added  to  this  the  request  whether  SEAC  could  give
permission to this group of Dutch KNIL soldiers in Singapore to officially form a battalion
and be allowed to carry firearms.158
This group from Singapore eventually arrived near Batavia in October 1945, where
it  would  soon  form into  the  Doorman  battalion.159 According  to  sources  that  McMillan
studied, all units south of Batavia were commanded by KNIL Major-General W. Schilling,
who arrived in Batavia with the first British troops. The British allowed three KNIL battalions
to land in early October 1945, which would be deployed in Batavia. It is unclear how these
forces had been reconstituted, but it is likely that Schilling collected former POWs himself
in Batavia, and others came from outside Java, and arrived with the British.  The British
however accused these reconstituted  forces of  being 'trigger  happy'  due to  numerous
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shooting incidents between KNIL soldiers, British and Indonesian troops.160
On the other side of Asia, the Americans recovered a large number of Dutch former
POWs in Japan and gathered them in Manila. Early September, the Dutch were already
planning  how  to  repatriate  this  group  as  quickly  as  possible.  Helfrich  suggested  to
repatriate  medical  personnel  to  Java by  Catalina planes,  because their  presence was
much required on Java.161 Weijerman informed the Dutch government in Brisbane on 25
September about around 6,700 former POWs that were available for shipping to Java
midst October. This shipping was provided by Lord Mountbatten, with whom he apparently
had  been  in  touch  with,  since  he  emphasised  that  the  Dutch  were  in  no  position  to
negotiate about this offer. Lord Mountbatten warned Weijerman that the Dutch must accept
this chance for shipping, because otherwise repatriation could last a long time, and space
on  ships  would  be  wasted.  The  Dutch  originally  did  not  want  unfit  KNIL  soldiers  to
repatriate yet, but were thus pressured by the British to decide otherwise. In the same
telegram, Weijerman also mentioned shipping from Saigon to the Netherlands East Indies
for  1742  Dutch  POWs,  which  could  be  possible  on  14  October.162 Van Oyen  replied
positively  on  this  message  on  7  October,  and  requested  his  colleagues  to  arrange
welcome for these POWs in Batavia.163 This is in contrast to the later British opinion about
repatriation from former POWs, when the British decided in November 1945 that no more
Dutch soldiers were allowed to arrive in the Netherlands East Indies.
These former POWs indeed never reached the Netherlands East Indies in October. 
On Java, tensions between Indonesian forces and KNIL troops had broken out. Moluccan
KNIL soldiers are blamed for these violent outbursts, although Dutch KNIL soldiers were
involved in these skirmishes too.164 Numerous shooting incidents between on the one hand
British and British Indian soldiers, and on the other hand Indonesians, took place. British
and  British  Indian  forces  found  themselves  in  an  'urban  guerrilla  war'  as  McMillan
analyses.165 This time period from 29 September 1945 was very violent,  especially  for
160McMillan, The British occupation, 85-86.
161NL-HaNA, Navy Ministry: BSO entry number 2.12.37, inv.no. 237: Helfrich's instructions for Lieutenant
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162NL-HaNA, Dutch Liaison Missions to GHQ and ALFSEA, 2.13.130, inv.no. 60: Letter from Weijerman,
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(Indo-)Dutch civilians, but also for the several different armed forces present in the area.
SEAC decided, in an attempt to prevent escalation, to prohibit more Dutch soldiers to enter
the  Netherlands  East  Indies.166 The  1,742  former  POWs  from  Saigon  were  thus  not
transferred to Batavia, but arrived in Singapore on 16 October. The same change applied
to the POWs from Manila. They were collected by Australian forces on Borneo, to where
they were transferred between 7 November and 6 December. On Borneo, 4,400 KNIL
soldiers were deployed again, with Japanese and Australian materiel,  others went into
Navy service again.167 Other KNIL soldiers, whose physical condition was very bad, were
given time to recover in the Netherlands or in Australia. They were redeployed halfway
through 1946.168 
The largest number of former POWs was in Burma and Siam. In December 1945,
around 11,000 Dutch POWs were situated in the Bangkok area. They were situated in old
military  training  camps,  that  used  to  be  used  by  the  Independent  Indian  Army. Their
officers were stationed in hotels in the same area. Captain J.B. Egelie of the KNIL General
Staff wrote a note about the situation in the camps around the end of November. He wrote
this in reaction to a news message from Aneta about the bad situation in these camps. He
claims that the leisure and training possibilities were fairly good, including military training.
Egelie's epistle is fairly positive. The only misfortune he describes is the fact that the Dutch
soldiers are still paid as former POWs, and thus receive less salary than nearby British
troops.169 As it is described in this letter, the former POWs were taken care of well. Egelie
however wrote this letter in response to a news post from a reporter in Singapore. It is
unclear whether Egelie had visited the Bangkok camps himself. He wrote his letter from
Batavia, but he could have been reported about the situation through NICA channels. A
letter that was sent much later, in May 1946, clearly shows a different image of how the
former POWs experienced the camps in Bangkok. According to Lieutenant-Colonel H.L.
Hoornweg, from the KNIL General Staff, it was promised to these former POWs that they
could quickly return to Java, if they joined the stoottroepen. Most soldiers wanted to return
home to their families and thus joined this unit, because they thought this would be the
fastest  way.  The  army  could  however  not  fulfil  this  promise,  and  the  (poorly)  trained
soldiers were transferred to Makassar, Celebes. Among the soldiers, there was general
166Elands,  "Strijd,  opheffing en erfenis",  28-29;  Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg,  American visions,  178;
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167Groen, “Prisoners of war, prisoners of peace”, 49-50 and 53.
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dissatisfaction  about  their  salary  and  the  fact  that  they  did  not  go  to  Java,  as  was
promised.170 The colonial government had estimated that these former POWs would have
been better, hence the plans that were made for them.
In southern Sumatra, problems for former POWs were different than in Burma, Siam
and the Philippines. In the Palembang area, the Dutch and Indonesian population was
dominated by terrorist  behaviour, which was not stopped by the Japanese. The senior
officer in command (Oudst aanwezend officier) reached out to Helfrich with the request to
send weapons and ammunition to the Dutch former POWs in the region. His first request,
dated 24 September 1945, did not have any effect, but his second request on 6 October
was forwarded to  the Netherlands Staff  Section in  Kandy, for  consultation with  SEAC.
Helfrich requested SEAC to send arms to Palembang, and to allow these KNIL soldiers to
stay in Palembang. The Allied Land Forces in Sumatra approved of this, provided that they
were equipped with British arms, not with Japanese, and that they would report to the
Allied Land Forces in Sumatra, not to NICA. In this way, the British could still control the
activities of these former POWs.171
These  examples  of  KNIL  groups  from  the  Philippines,  Thailand,  Sumatra  and
Singapore are not the only ones, but the ones who stand out in archival sources because
of  their  size and level  of  activity.  Some groups were effective  in  their  attempts  to  re-
militarise,  others  were  not.  British  forces  in  Java  later  considered  some re-militarised
groups as 'trigger happy', like the Doorman battalion.172 For this matter, one can reconsider
whether  it  was  useful  for  the  Dutch  government  to  form army units  that  consisted  of
Moluccan and Dutch former POWs this quickly, and let them participate in the fight against
nationalist  Indonesians.  Already  in  1945,  the  units  that  consisted  of  mostly  Moluccan
soldiers  had  the  image  of  intimidating,  seasoned  soldiers  that  used  extreme  force.173
During the following Independence War, this image had not changed. Indonesian KNIL
soldiers were still seen, by their KL colleagues, as soldiers that could be leaned on, and
that were not hesitant to use violence.174
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Changes and adjustments in autumn 1945
The analysis  above of  the  changes  took  place  in  Southeast  Asia  after  the  Japanese
surrender  provides  insight  in  what  problems  the  Dutch  colonial  officials  and  army
commanders encountered. They had to adapt to decisions that were made by SEAC and
the British occupational force in the Netherlands East Indies, and they were affected by
American and Australian decisions as well, mainly about the recovery of POWs. The Dutch
tried to negotiate with the British about the options they had to repatriate former POWs to
the Netherlands East  Indies.  During those first  months  after  the  surrender,  the  British
made several miscalculations about the situation for the IFTUs on Java and Sumatra. On
29 September, Lord Mountbatten decided that the British forces would only occupy certain
key areas in major cities, and gather IFTUs in those cities. This decision was followed by
the development of a revolutionary situation, exactly what Lord Mountbatten had tried to
avoid.175 Between late October until early November, the situation worsened in Surabaya.
British and British Indian soldiers fought with Indonesian nationalists in order to reoccupy
the city. This led to immense fighting and thousands of casualties on both sides.176 After
the Battle of Surabaya, the British were determined to not let the situation escalate any
more,  and  decided  to  not  allow  Dutch  forces  to  enter  the  Netherlands  East  Indies.
Because of this decision, Dutch former POWs around Southeast Asia were forced to stay
in transit camps. Their living conditions will  be discussed in the next chapter. In SWPA
areas, the Americans wanted the Dutch POWs to leave Manila, where they had gathered
around 6,700 Dutch POWs. The Americans came up with a solution that the Australians
also  approved  of:  these  former  POWs  would  be  deployed  in  outer  regions  of  the
archipelago,  like Borneo,  where they would  serve under  Australian supervision.  These
KNIL troops were later moved to Java and Sumatra, when the Dutch army command was
fully re-established there in 1946.
The emergence of the nationalist movement caused disagreements between the
British  and  the  Dutch  about  what  strategy  to  use.  The  British  aimed  for  a  political
agreement, while the Dutch had internal differences what to do. The government did not
allow Van Mook to talk to Indonesian nationalists. In particular, it ruled out the option that it
would  negotiate  with  Indonesian  nationalists  like  Sukarno,  whom they  regarded  as  a
collaborator.177 He was however convinced by Lord Mountbatten in early October to talk to
175De Jong, De terugtocht, 25-27.
176McMillan, The British occupation, 38-54.
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some Republican representatives. Helfrich and Van Oyen opposed this idea.178 They were
convinced that the Dutch armed forces would be able to fight and defeat the nationalists.
Spoor, who was optimistic about the strength of the Dutch troops, agreed with them.179
Spoor's optimism contradicted with Schilling's cautious perception that around 100,000
soldiers would be needed for at least three years to reconquer the entire archipelago. 180
Historians  have  considered  the  theory  that  the  Dutch  government  choose  Spoor  to
become the next army commander because of his optimistic view on the strength of the
Dutch army in the Netherlands East Indies.
In the post-war period, many debates were conducted about the subject whether
the Dutch wanted to (gradually) decolonise the Netherlands East Indies, or did they want
to fight against Indonesian nationalists to continue colonial rule?181 De Jong thinks that Van
Mook changed his opinion  from November 1945, about the idea that he wanted to restore
colonial rule, to the idea that he preferred decolonisation in a federal state.182 Van den
Berge agrees with De Jong on this point: Van Mook would have considered that a political
solution  would  be  the  best  solution.183 Both  pathways,  fighting  and  negotiating,  were
choosen by the Dutch:  between April  1946 and November 1949,  multiple conferences
were held and several agreements were made, of which only the last one, the Round
Table Conference in 1949, would be effective. Shortly after the end of this conference,
recognition of Indonesian independence followed on 27 December 1949.
Besides political talks with the Republic, the Netherlands also decided to continue
building on a large colonial army in order to fight the Indonesian nationalists. Many Dutch
leaders considered the former POWs from the KNIL unfit for military service on Java and
Sumatra, because of their physical and mental unfitness, even though armed forces were
much needed there. Plans for different armies were made during the Second World War,
and all  except one are deployed during the Independence War. At first, the Dutch had
planned gezagbataljons (peace and order battalions). These units were sent to Southeast
Asia, but were abolished in January 1946 before being put in action. The soldiers were
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divided among other units.184 The Marine Corps and war volunteers were only allowed to
disembark  in  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  from March  1946.  From October  1946,  the
Netherlands  also  deployed  conscript  soldiers  overseas,  after  the  law  that  prohibited
deployment of  conscripts outside of  the Netherlands was changed. Last  but  not  least,
NICA was also deployed after the Japanese surrender, as a militarised civil organisation.
Mutual feelings of resentment between Navy (which included the Marine Corps) and
KNIL were set aside, as well did Helfrich and Spoor reconcile, when they felt threatened by
the powers that Van Mook, Van der Plas and other government officials assigned to NICA.
This organisation was originally set up in the case the Americans liberated the Netherlands
East  Indies,  to  restore  Dutch  civil  rule.  Van  Mook  still  thought  NICA  would  be  the
organisation to carry out this task, also after the border changes to SEAC. Buurman van
Vreeden, Helfrich and Spoor preferred the KNIL and Marine Corps to establish Dutch rule
again. They insisted on constituting temporary Military Authority, which Van Mook opposed.
He considered colonial restoration as a political matter, and preferred to keep distance
from the KNIL while implementing colonial rule again.185
Conclusion
The Dutch colonial  rulers and army commanders had different opinions on how to re-
establish colonial rule in the Netherlands East Indies. Most of the military commanders
were  straightforward  soldiers,  who  preferred  fighting  over  political  discussions.  They
differed in opinion with the colonial politicians, of whom some preferred to negotiate with
the Republicans. Generally, two sides can be distinguished: the civil  approach and the
military  approach.  Politicians  like  Van  Mook  and  Van  der  Plas  wanted  to  talk  to
Republicans,  while soldiers like Helfrich,  Spoor  and Van Oyen had mutual  differences
about which strategies to use, and whether to use the colonial army or Navy and Marine
Corps.  Both  pathways  were  chosen:  Van  Mook  started  to  negotiate  with  Indonesian
nationalists in October 1945, while newly recruited forces were sent overseas to join the
colonial army, which was re-established in 1945 and 1946. The British occupation forces
on Java had a large influence on how the political situation developed between September
and November 1945, whereby the Dutch had to adjust to these changes.
Most KNIL soldiers considered the Netherlands East Indies their home. They started
to  form army units  in  their  POW camps after  the  Japanese surrender  and asked the
184"Gezagbataljon  Indië  (GBI)",  on  website  Indië  1945-1950.  Consulted  on  20  January  2016.  See:
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government to be repatriated. However, the majority of former POWs preferred to return
home over the idea of entering a new war. The only way they could return home however
was to rejoin the army. As Romijn stated: "For KNIL soldiers, re-entering military service
was not  simply a vocation,  but a survival strategy."186 This is clearly visible in archival
sources, like letters that KNIL soldiers in camps sent to the Dutch government and NICA,
and in egodocuments that they published after the wars. These personal visions will be
discussed in the next chapter.
186Romijn, "Learning on 'the job'”, 326.
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Chapter 4: KNIL soldiers' opinions in letters and egodocuments
Introduction
Most Dutch former POWs of the colonial army were gathered in camps in cities around
Southeast Asia, due to the difficult political and military situation in the Netherlands East
Indies in autumn 1945. The Dutch government influenced how these former POWs lived
and were trained again. In this chapter, the question what the soldiers themselves thought
of how the government handled the situation is discussed, to demonstrate the interaction
between the government and the soldiers. Historical writing used to be focused on big
events and key actors. Recently, attention for common people has grown, as can been
determined from the amount of egodocuments that is studied recently.187 Egodocuments
reveal  an  interesting  perspective,  that  is  not  found  in  sources  that  originate  from the
government.
The experiences of KNIL soldiers influenced their thinking in a later time, not only
when they lost their job in 1950 because of the KNIL's liquidation but also afterwards,
during the remainder of the twentieth century. Many Dutch and Moluccan KNIL soldiers
were thence forced to move to the Netherlands from 1950 onwards. How these people
thought  about  this  situation  is  important,  because  it  adds  an  explanation  to  how  the
decolonisation  of  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  was  processed  in  the  Netherlands.
Important questions that have to do with these personal opinions are the following: first,
what did they say about the government's decisions for the KNIL? Second, what did the
government do with these opinions? And third, how were these opinions important for the
group  of  Indische  people  that  ended  up  in  the  Netherlands  after  the  wars?  These
questions  add  a  new  perspective  to  the  general  question  of  this  thesis,  how  the
government made plans about a certain group, how this group reacted to those plans, and
how  this  situation  was  significant  for  what  the  KNIL  soldiers  thought  about  their
deployment and their future with the armed forces.
Opinions of POWs
KNIL soldiers have spoken out, although not always successfully, since 1945, when the
Dutch-Indische union of former POWs and internees (NIBEG, Nederlands-Indische Bond
187R. Dekker (ed.), Egodocuments and history. Autobiographical writing in its social context since the Middle
Ages (Hilversum 2002).
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voor  Ex-Krijgsgevangenen en Geïnterneerden)  was established  in  the POW camps in
Siam in September 1945.188 This discussion was usually about how they thought that the
Dutch government mistreated them, both in moral  sense and in juridical ways.  This is
however not loudly proclaimed. As Bussemaker states, Indische people were generally not
the  type  of  people  that  spoke  out  very  loudly,  hence  the  expression  Indisch  zwijgen
(Indisch muteness).189 Bussemaker's book on how the Indische community tried to receive
acknowledgement  after  the  Second  World  War  shows  the  difficulties  that  apparently
belong with decolonisation, such as legal recognition of wartime injuries, both material and
physical.  The first  main problem was the 'backpay',  the payment  of  wages to  colonial
soldiers and administrators during their imprisonment by the Japanese, a second one was
about their abrupt resignation of the KNIL in 1950. There was general misunderstanding
between people from the Netherlands and from the former Netherlands East Indies about
experiences during Second World War and Independence War and about colonial life in
general. A third point was social problems that people of mixed descent encountered, not
only Indo-Dutch people after moving to the Netherlands, but also people in Indonesia with
a Dutch ancestor.190 All of these problems started the moment the Second World War was
over: when the KNIL soldiers were remilitarised, over-deployed during the Independence
War, and dismissed in 1950. After that year, many of the Dutch soldiers were sent to the
Netherlands, which was not 'going home' for most of them. In particular the years 1945
and  1950  were  decisive  for  the  soldiers'  opinions  about  decisions  of  the  colonial
government.
Egodocuments  are  a  great  source of  personal  information,  that  is  not  found  in
sources  that  were  produced  by  a  government.  Sadly,  a  large-scale  research  into
egodocuments  of  KNIL  soldiers  is  not  yet  conducted.  Many  egodocuments  of  KNIL
soldiers still lie in archives and libraries to be researched for information about warfare,
military culture and war crimes. Sadly, the egodocuments from the 1940s usually cover
one war, or the other, and not the time period in between, which is essential for this current
research. Therefore, three egodocuments and four letters are shown here. These are not
necessarily  representative  for  the  entire  group  of  KNIL  soldiers.  Complemented  with
literature from Bussemaker and Meijer, these writings provide an example of how the KNIL
soldiers thought of how their government handled the postwar situation. These opinions
188H. Meijer, Indische rekening. Indië, Nederland en de backpay-kwestie 1945-2005 (Amsterdam 2005) 28.
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can be found in both egodocuments and letters, that the soldiers wrote to the government
and their family.
The  first  egodocument  that  is  discussed  below  is  Giovanni  Hakkenberg's.
Hakkenberg was not a KNIL soldier, but served in the Royal Navy in Surabaya when the
Second World War broke out. His experiences during and after the war are nevertheless
similar  to  those  of  KNIL  soldiers.191 The  second  egodocument  is  written  by  Lodewijk
Koppijn,  who  joined  the  colonial  army  after  his  youth  in  Amsterdam.  Koppijn's
egodocument has a bitter and sarcastic tone.192 The third egodocument is written by KNIL
sergeant J. a, a totok who joined the KNIL as a twenty-year-old. He extensively describes
the living conditions of former POWs in Siam.193
Another interesting source of KNIL soldiers' opinions are letters they wrote to the
Dutch government. The government was, as is earlier discussed, not prepared for the end
of the war and although different organisations for recovery of POWs and civilians were
established, these organisations were unable to do all the work they had to do. Also, the
British prohibition to return to Java and Sumatra heavily influenced this situation. More
than 11.000 POWs were left in camps for months, waiting for the Dutch government to
recover them.194 Other Allies recovered their former interned personnel and civilians much
quicker. KNIL soldiers in those camps sent letters to the Queen and NICA, in order to ask
for their help. A few of these letters are preserved in the National Archive, and they were
also discussed during meetings of the Dutch War Council (Raad voor Oorlogvoering) in
autumn 1945. 
The division into SEAC and SWPA areas caused a great difference in the way the
POWs were treated, how well they were treated, and how the communication with their
country  of  origin  was  could  take place.  In  the  SEAC areas,  the  British  provided little
information to the POWs and left most work to the Dutch. Great Britain and Australia even
argued on who was going to take care of Borneo and eastern regions of the Netherlands
East  Indies,  and  because  of  this  quarrel,  they  arrived  in  these  regions  later,  from  5
September. Americans had taken better preparations. First, they did not discuss with their
Allies on how POWs were rescued, but simply decided that they were going to evacuate
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them to Manila, using ships and airplanes. Second, LOC teams arrived there quite soon:
on 21 and 22 August, a team of 27 Dutchmen arrived in the Philippines. Around 6,700
Dutch former POWs were evacuated from Japan to the Philippines, where they received
extensive medical care to recover.195 The conclusion can be drawn that the Americans
undertook their recovery task much better than the generally underprepared British, who
did not have enough resources and manpower to carry out all the tasks they had to do.196
Letters to the authorities
When Dutch soldiers noticed that they had to stay in the transit camps much longer than
their fellow former POWs of other nationalities, they started to express their dissatisfaction
about this. Around 6,700 KNIL soldiers from Manilla were transported relatively quickly, in
november 1945, to the outer islands of the archipelago (the Grote Oost), where they were
joined by two batallions from Bangkok in January 1946. Around 9,000 former POWs in
Bangkok and 6,300 in Singapore were still waiting for repatriation in January 1946.197 A few
months  earlier,  in  autumn  1945,  Dutch  former  POWs  reached  out  to  their  (colonial)
government  and  to  NICA for  support.  The  letters  they  wrote  were  not  only  personal
epistles on the disappointment about their living conditions, but also formal requests for
permission  to  form an  army unit  and be equipped with  weapons.  These were  mainly
addressed to NICA senior officers, or on a later date, to Queen Wilhelmina. Letters that
were written by former POWs in Siam were usually addressed to the head of the Dutch
Military  Mission  in  Bangkok,  Colonel  J.B.  Haverkorn  van  Rijzewijk,  who  was  the  first
contact for the former POWs there. Letters to NICA were handled within NICA, the letters
to the Queen were discussed in the War Council meetings.198 Haverkorn was repeatedly
contacted  by  KNIL soldiers  around  Bangkok,  with  requests  for  reunification  with  their
spouses, who worked as nurses for RAPWI and happened to be deployed in the same
area.199
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The first letter to be discussed here is written by A.G. Mantel, who was an Artillery
Major in the KNIL imprisoned in Burma. Mantel contacted General-Major Weyerman on 6
November  1945.  He  requested  two  things,  one  personal  and  one  for  the  recently
established  army  company  in  Rangoon,  from  where  he  was  writing  his  letter.  This
handwritten, long and emotional letter to Weyerman is probably one of many, although this
is so far the only one in this inventory number.200 Mantel had asked his overste Lieutenant-
Colonel Scheurer, the senior officer in command, whether the bored and worried KNIL
soldiers were allowed to start exercise, but RAPWI Rangoon initially refused this request.
After the situation on Java worsened in October 1945, another request was forwarded to
ALFSEA, and Mantel and Scheurer were permitted to form a company out of soldiers that
were considered healthy by the medical officers. Mantel's personal request to Weyerman
was to be transferred to a different army unit, since his prewar experience in the military
was not in as a troop commanding officer, but in artillery. His experience would be more
useful elsewhere.201 Unfortunately, no response letter was found in the archives.
Another letter, with appendix, by the aforementioned Scheurer is also found in the
archive. Scheurer sent a letter to Weyerman in October 1945, in which he explained the
request to ALFSEA and also mentioned the approval to form a company. Scheurer offered
Weyerman around 240 Dutch KNIL soldiers, former POWs, including twenty officers and
two NCO's, who were ready for deployment. Scheurer also mentioned, as one of the few,
the displaced Javanese persons that were not taken care of by RAPWI. Scheurer's other
letter in the appendix to his letter to Weyerman was addressed to RAPWI, and contained
the request to move with the group of former POWs to a camp that was more suitable for
training and living,  also to improve moral  among the troops.  Approximately half  of  the
former POWs were, in Scheurer's eyes, fit  for active service.202 Scheurer's letters were
more formal, and contained no personal requests. Unfortunately, no more letters about the
further formation of this company in Rangoon have been found so far.
Also stored in the National Archive is a letter written by KNIL soldier Josef Crutzen,
originally  from Kerkrade,  where his  family  still  lived. His letter from Bangkok dates 15
200NL-HaNA, Dutch Liaison Missions to GHQ and ALFSEA, 2.13.130, inv.no. 60: Letter from Major A.G.
Mantel, former POW in 5-FAHRU camp in Rangoon, Burma, to General-Major Weyerman, NICA, Kandy
[6 November 1945].
201NL-HaNA, Dutch Liaison Missions to GHQ and ALFSEA, 2.13.130, inv.no. 60: Letter from Major A.G.
Mantel, former POW in 5-FAHRU camp in Rangoon, Burma, to General-Major Weyerman, NICA, Kandy
[6 November 1945].
202NL-HaNA, Dutch Liaison Missions to GHQ and ALFSEA, 2.13.130, inv.no. 68: Letter and appendix from
Lieutenant-Colonel H.L. Scheurer, former POW in Rangoon, to General-Major Weyerman, NICA, Kandy
[11 October 1945].
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February 1946, a little later than the discussed letters above. Crutzen commenced his
letter with the message that he now wanted to write about how the living situation in the
former POW camp was, and to be truly honest about his situation. He mentioned that the
situation  was not  better  than when they were  still  in  Japanese  imprisonment,  and he
continued with a description of how the Dutch former POWs lived in the transit camp in
Bangkok.  They  slept  on  the  floor,  they  were  mistreated  by  the  British  and  American
supervisors,  the  money  they  received  was  used  for  buying  food  since  the  food  they
received was often of  a  bad quality.  He also indicated the differences with  the  Dutch
officers, who were also former POWs. They were situated in better quarters, they had
more spare time and received better and more food. When the soldiers complained with
their officers about their living conditions, they shrugged and said "We are working on it",
which clearly did not happen.203
Another interesting remark in his letter is how Crutzen and his fellows thought about
the Dutch plans to let them re-enter military service. Despite their physical conditions, the
Dutch commanders still had plans to deploy them on Java again. Crutzen wrote: "No, my
dear father, there is no one among the boys, who feels like doing that. They, the lords
superior,  caused  this  because  of  their  own  actions.  The  Dutch  officers  agreed  with
everything. They do not care about the fate of their subordinates. Why not? Because they,
the lords superior, are doing fine." This corresponds with Romijn's statement that most
KNIL soldiers were not eager to fight, but re-entered military service as a survival strategy.
They had no other option. In an egodocument that is handled below, this perspective is
discussed more extensively.204
In his final paragraph, Crutzen asks his father to publish the letter, so that others
also know about their horrible situation.205 Crutzen's father did not forward his son's letter
to a newspaper,206 but his father sent the letter to the Queen directly after receiving it on 6
March 1946. It  took the government over three months to  answer, which it  did with a
general message that was not specified into Crutzen's situation. On behalf of the Queen
and the Minister of Colonies, an answer was sent to Crutzen's father about his son's long
stay in Siam. It contained these two points: First, a re-inspection committee had to check
203National Archive, The Hague, Commissariat for Indische Affairs, entry number 2.10.49, inventory number
3335: file with letter and decision on complaints received about the situation in Thailand [27 June 1946].
204NL-HaNA,  Commissariat  for  Indische  Affairs,  2.10.49,  inv.no.  3335:  file  with  letter  and  decision  on
complaints received about the situation in Thailand [27 June 1946]; Romijn, "Learning on 'the job'", 326.
205NL-HaNA,  Commissariat  for  Indische  Affairs,  2.10.49,  inv.no.  3335:  file  with  letter  and  decision  on
complaints received about the situation in Thailand [27 June 1946].
206At least, no relevent hits came up in Delpher. Website consulted on 26 February 2016.
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all  the  former  POWs on  their  fitness,  and second,  the  highest  priority  for  shipping  is
granted to those who need it the most. This response did not mention anything specific on
Crutzen's case and was therefore useless for him personally.207 It is however interesting to
see how long it took before the Dutch government decided on this matter and answered,
while the War Council discussed other letters shortly after receiving. The government, and
foremost Spoor, not only wanted to verify the fitness of the former POWs, it also wanted to
re-check their reliability, concerning possible incorrect behaviour during the Second World
War.208
A letter that did reach the newspapers was one written by a group of former POWs.
On 12 March 1946,  The  Curaçaoean newspaper  Amigoe di Curaçao published a press
statement  that  was  released  through  Aneta,  a  press  agency  in  the  Netherlands  East
Indies. In this statement, former POWs stated that they were the 'forgotten men' during this
war. They stated that they were living in a situation that “resembles a life as a prisoner, in
contrast with the American and British POWs that have already been repatriated.”209 This
press  statement,  that  reached  Curaçao  through  Aneta,  did  not  reach  any  other
newspapers, not in the Netherlands, nor in the Netherlands East Indies.
Government reactions to these letters
It  was  not  clear  for  every  letter  whether  and  how  the  Dutch  government  and  NICA
responded. The Dutch however were aware of the situation in Bangkok through letters
from other KNIL soldiers, which were sent in autumn 1945.210 In the Dutch War Council
meeting of 31 October 1945, this was discussed for the first time when former POWs had
reached  out  to  their  government  about  their  critical  living  situation.  Prime Minister  W.
Schermerhorn had received a letter  from a group of  KNIL soldiers that  had not  heard
anything of the Dutch after the war, until the moment of writing on 21 October. Minister
E.N. van Kleffens,  of  the Department for Foreign Affairs,  thereat described the difficult
situation  in  Bangkok,  where  the  government  had  to  improvise  a  Dutch  mission.  He
criticised the British and Australians, of whom he said that they only cared for their own
citizens. That this was not the situation, can be seen from a letter that is discussed the
week after.  The provisionally mission that  had been sent  to Bangkok was intended to
improve  the  situation,  while  attempts  to  improve  mail  connections  between  the
207NL-HaNA,  Commissariat  for  Indische  Affairs,  2.10.49,  inv.no.  3335:  file  with  letter  and  decision  on
complaints received about the situation in Thailand [27 June 1946].
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Netherlands and Batavia were halfway there.211 
The  following  week  during  the  War  Council  meeting,  Schermerhorn  again
mentioned lots of letters he received from former POWs in Siam. These letters all reported
the same situation: former POWs had a total lack of attention from the Dutch side, but
received more than enough care from the British. Van Kleffens' criticism that the British did
not take care of the Dutch POWs was possibly intended in the case of help to the Dutch
government, not to the Dutch POWs. Irritation between the governments existed since the
transfer  of  responsibilities  about  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  to  SEAC.  Schermerhorn
wanted this situation about these POWs to change, and asked his Minister for Colonies to
provide more possibilities for relaxing and recreation. Again, the difficult mail connection
with  Batavia  was  put  forward.  Two things  were  considered  necessary  for  the  former
POWs: physical and mental care, and re-formation into army units, for which they would
need arms and other equipment. The War Council decided on asking the British War Office
for  armature  and  equipment  for  around  12.000  soldiers.212 Getting  equipment  and
weaponry was of course a necessary step, but the Dutch politicians did not hesitate to
directly think of asking their Allies for this, instead of reflecting whether they could have
done something themselves. Also, it now looks like nothing about the physical and mental
care for the POWs is discussed, which would have been the first logical step in attempting
to re-establish the army. Another topic that was not discussed is whether these former
POWs, who had been imprisoned and forced to work for the past three and a half years,
were willing to fight again. That they were not eager to take up arms, is clear from their
personal statements in egodocuments.
Egodocuments
It seems that there is a tradition of publishing one's personal letters or diaries from the time
someone spent in the Netherlands East Indies. From the nineteenth century, these were
mainly documents written by missionaries and employees of the Binnenlands Bestuur (BB,
the colonial  administration),  and soldiers  reporting on the Aceh war. For  the twentieth
century, many egodocuments from the Second World War reported on internment and
forced labour, and also lots of soldiers published their egodocuments on the time they
spent in Indonesia during the Independence War.213 In egodocuments on both these wars,
211NIB I, no. 274.
212NIB I, no. 316.
213Heijmans-Van Bruggen, De Japanse bezetting in dagboeken; Oostindie, Soldaat in Indonesië; Scagliola,
Last van de oorlog.
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KNIL soldiers also reported on their experiences directly after the Japanese surrender,
when  the  Second  World  War  had  ended  but  when  they  had  not  returned  to  the
Netherlands East Indies yet. This situation was similar for soldiers from KNIL and Navy,
and of course for civil internees. It is therefore insignificant with which armed forces the
POWs served,  since  their  experiences  were  more  or  less  the  same when  they  were
captured and imprisoned at the same place and time.
The first egodocument that is discussed here is from Giovanni Hakkenberg. Mens
en marinier  is a biography based on Hakkenberg's personal memoirs and testimonies.
Hakkenberg served in the Navy but his wartime experiences were similar to those of KNIL
soldiers.  After  the  completion  of  the  Burma-Siam  railway,  Hakkenberg  had  been
transported to Japan to continue his forced labour. He was later liberated there by the
Americans, and was transported to recover in Manila. From there, other POWs from Great
Britain,  Australia  and the United States could be repatriated quickly, but  Dutch former
POWs were left  waiting. The situation that no one could provide information about his
family back in the Netherlands East Indies, is described comprehensively in his memoirs.
Only scarce rumours on the political situation reached the transit camps in the Philippines.
In  particular  Hakkenberg's  fellow  Indo-Dutch  POWs,  who  had  families  in  Java  and
Sumatra, were worried sick about the hopeless situation at home.214
A KNIL soldier who wrote extensively about his experiences in the period after the
surrender was Lodewijk Koppijn, who compares the situation of the Dutch former POWs
with his fellow POWs from Australia and Great Britain. The Australians who worked in the
kitchens of the POWs camps after the Japanese surrender still had their payment books,
and were weekly paid for their work. The Dutch, in Koppijn's words, did not receive any
salary: "Wij kregen geen barst."215 Koppijn was ordered to train Dutch troops in Singapore
until August 1946, whereafter he was allowed to return home on his own.216 He was not
supported by the colonial government with how to contact his family in Ambon, where his
spouse and children apparently had fallen sick, as he was not supported with returning
home.
Sergeant J. Muller was another soldier who published about his experiences during
the  Second  World  War.  In  his  authobiography,  he  describes  how the  Japanese  were
ordered to gather the former POWs in Changi, near Singapore. A few hours after arrival
214Bosman and Escher, Giovanni Hakkenberg, 105-108.
215Koppijn, Pa Koppijn, 184.
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there, the Americans already collected some their own by airplane.217 It took the Dutch
however much more time to repatriate their soldiers, who were impatient to return home:
"The former POWs felt abandoned by their own government. All the other nations had left.
It was to cry about, which many did!!"218 Muller wrote how new army units were formed in
Singapore.  Only very sick men were spared,  the others were summoned:  "One could
count on being deployed again in the new war. There was no other possibility. There were
no fresh troops. Every manpower that we had during the war, was made prisoner of war by
the Japs,  and civilians were interned."219 Muller  also expresses his  feelings  about  the
British temporary authority over the Netherlands East Indies. He thinks it is ridiculous that
the Dutch had to ask permission to the British before they could re-enter their  colony
again. He blames the Dutch government for its weak attitude on a political level.220
Significance of these opinions
It is very difficult to deduce a conclusion from a small number of personal testimonies such
as analysed in this research. Scholars should act carefully with these personal information,
however  in  large  amounts  and  combined  with  other  sources,  they  can  be  used  for
historical  research.  The  ideas  that  KNIL soldiers  sketched  in  egodocuments  however
reflect  thoughts that can be found in existing literature.221 Personal  opinions about the
actions of the Dutch government were not positive, neither are they very different from
each other. In general, KNIL soldiers missed home, family, clothing and other aspects to
create a slightly more comfortable living situation and to improve their physical condition
after three years of internment and forced labour. Also, lack of attention and information
from the government is an important and recurrent complaint. As Josef Crutzen wrote in
the letter to his father, many KNIL soldiers did not want to return into military service after
their  mistreatment.  The  statement  in  Hakkenberg's  egodocument,  that  most  soldiers
primarily wanted to return to the Netherlands East Indies to be reunited with their families,
not to fight against Indonesian nationalists, is supported by archival sources that are used
in chapter 3. Initially, most Indo-Dutch colleagues of Hakkenberg were not against the
establishment of an independent republic instead of Dutch rule in the archipelago.222 Other
soldiers criticised the weak attitude of the Dutch government, especially concerning the
217Muller, Doorbraak, 142-143.
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British occupation.223
These personal testimonies are important since they demonstrate the differences
between the ideas the Dutch (colonial)  government had about  re-establishment  of  the
KNIL, and the reasons the KNIL soldiers themselves had for why they wanted to return to
the Netherlands East Indies. The soldiers' physical and mental situation in fall 1945 was
bad, and the government not only highly underestimated this, but also choose to ignore it.
These soldiers were necessary in order to fight. This becomes clear from the War Council
meeting reports and archival reports.224 Most KNIL soldiers had not seen their families for
years and many of them did not know whether their families were safe. Most soldiers were
considered fit for duty due to the high need of experienced soldiers. Even though they
were not fit, most soldiers wanted to return to their families and thus did not oppose this
decision,  since  this  was  the  only  way  they  could  return  to  their  families  as  soon  as
possible. Most KNIL soldiers subsequently had to serve until December 1947 or January
1948 before they were allowed to go on a longer leave. Some war volunteers, who were in
service since the summer of 1945 and were on active duty since March 1946, were even
allowed to return to the Netherlands before the KNIL soldiers were allowed to go on leave.
The reason why the government hesitated to send these soldiers on a leave earlier, was
because of their knowledge about the colonial society and thus their value for the armed
forces.225 These  differences  demonstrate  the  recurring  misunderstanding  between The
Hague government and the people in the Netherlands East Indies who were subject of
everything that was decided for them, and also shows the need for experienced soldiers in
the Independence War. Between 70,000 and 80,000 soldiers were deployed in a newly
reformed KNIL between  1945 and 1950.  Their  knowledge about  colonial  warfare  was
indispensable. Their attitude was often seen as violent,  which was both respected and
feared.226
Aftermath and decolonisation
After  the recognition of the Indonesian Republic and the subsequent liquidation of the
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colonial  army on 26 July 1950, its soldiers were no longer needed in Indonesia.  Most
Dutch soldiers went (back) to the Netherlands, but for Indonesians in the colonial army, an
uncertain period began. Besides the option to demobilise, they were offered a transfer to
the  Tentara  Nasional  Indonesia  (TNI,  the  army  of  the  Indonesian  Republic).  Most
Moluccan soldiers did not want to transfer since they felt a stronger connection with the
Moluccas,  and  saw  Republicans  as  their  opponent.  In  1950,  a  group  of  Moluccans
proclaimed the Republic of South Moluccas (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS), that led to a
revolut that was knocked down by the Indonesian government in November 1950. After
these events,  many Moluccan soldiers refused to demobilise in the Moluccas and the
Dutch  government  decided  to  transport  these  KNIL  soldiers  and  their  families  to  the
Netherlands in 1951, where they originally would stay for 6 months at most and thereafter
would return to Indonesia. Around 12,500 Moluccans ended up in the Netherlands, where
they were housed in army barracks and former German internment camps that were not
temporary in the end. The government decided to dismis the Moluccans from the KNIL,
which  was  against  agreements  made  earlier.  The  presence  of  Moluccans  in  the
Netherlands continued to be problematic. Moluccan violence reached its climax during the
train hijacking at De Punt in 1977. After this, the Moluccan dispute would go on until 1986,
when  relations  between  the  Dutch  government  and  Moluccans  were  normalised.  The
majority  of  the  Moluccans  in  the  Netherlands  lived  in  closed  communities  or  special
neighbourhoods during the twentieth century.227
Another lingering problem that was only settled recently, in January 2016, is the so-
called backpay affair.228 The Dutch government argued that they were not required to pay
wages to their employers and soldiers during the Japanese occupation. Formally-legally
the government was right about this, but in every other aspect, the government had a
weak position.229 Meijer's book about this question demonstrates the difficulties Indische
and Moluccan veterans encountered in their struggle with the Dutch government to finally
receive recognition. The decolonisation of the Netherlands East Indies and some of its
problems were in particular significant for the soldiers of the colonial army, of all different
origins, and for (Indo-)Dutch civilians that used to live in the Netherlands East Indies and
227Bussemaker, Indisch verdriet, 54; Meijer and Brocades Zaalberg, "De verloren slag om het moederland",
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moved to the Netherlands in the 1940s and 1950s.
Conclusion
Personal  testimonies  from  letters,  found  in  archives,  and  published  egodocuments
demonstrate  how  KNIL  soldiers  thought  the  Dutch  government  handled  the  post-war
situation. It is researched how these opinions were significant for what the KNIL soldiers,
and with  them other  Indische people,  thought  of  the actions of  the Dutch government
during the decolonisation period and its aftermath during in twentieth century. The attitude
that the government had concerning the KNIL problems was crucial for how the veterans
reflected  on the  colonial  period.  They felt  disrespected and not  taken seriously,  as  is
shown in the backpay affair.  In 1945,  they reached out  for  help through letters to  the
Queen and NICA. These letters show a picture of a spineless government. During War
Council  meetings, Dutch politicians also did not seem willing and capable to solve the
problems  that  were  addressed  in  these  letters.  Like  the  letters,  the  egodocuments
complement  the  bigger  picture,  which  is  more  extensively  demonstrated  in  books  by
Bussemaker  and  Meijer.  This  shows  how  the  colonial  government  miscalculated  the
capacities of the KNIL after the Second World War, how KNIL soldiers were over-deployed
during the Independence War, and how the Dutch government disrespected its soldiers
after the liquidation of the colonial army.
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Conclusion
Between 1942 and 1949, two successive wars took place in the Netherlands East Indies.
First, the Second World War resulted in the Japanese occupation, that started on 8 March
1942.  Shortly  after  the  surrender  of  the  Japanese  army  on  15  August,  Indonesian
nationalists  proclaimed  the  independent  Republik  Indonesia  on  17  August  1945.  The
Netherlands  did  not  want  to  give  up  its  colony  and  this  resulted  in  the  Indonesian
Independence War, which endured until 27 December 1949. On that date, the Netherlands
recognised Indonesian independence. Dutch troops withdrew in the course of 1950. The
colonial army played a significant role in both wars. The KNIL was established in 1830 and
had fought, and won, several conflicts before it was defeated by the Japanese army in
1942. During the Second World War, the colonial government and army leaders who had
gone into exile, made plans for re-establishment of the KNIL after the war. This thesis
researches these plans and the outcomes and adjustments to these plans. More specific,
this  research  is  first  about  the  plans  that  were  made  during  the  Second  World  War,
second, about the adjustments to these plans, that had to be made between 15 August
1945 and March 1946, due to changes that took place in autumn 1945, and third, what the
KNIL  soldiers  themselves  thought  about  how  the  colonial  government  handled  the
situation. This thesis research focuses on expectations that both sides, the government
and the soldiers, had about the re-establishment of the colonial army. These expectations
often were mismanaged, when plans had to be adjusted again to new situations.
During the Japanese occupation, the Dutch colonial leaders started planning their return to
the colony. They had different opinions about whether they wanted to participate in fighting
against Japan. This choice was also associated with the idea that the Dutch had to choose
between the United States or Great Britain as their main ally. Helfrich wanted the KNIL and
Royal Navy to participate in the war, in co-operation with the British. Spoor also preferred a
strong KNIL, but wanted to leave the fighting to the Americans. Van Mook wanted to leave
the fighting to the Americans as well, but preferred NICA to take up the task of restoring
colonial rule, since he considered that a civil-political task, not a military one. In a typical
Dutch tradition, the final solution was a compromise: different new armed forces were set
up, as well as the civil organisation NICA. Plans for a Marine Corps, that was trained in the
United States, were carried out. War volunteers were recruited in the Netherlands from
1944 and partly trained in Great Britain. Soldiers joined these armed forces with the idea
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that they would participate in fighting against Japan, but the purpose of their deployment
changed into restoring 'peace and order' and fighting against Indonesian nationalists after
17 August  1945.  The Dutch had assumed that  former POWs could return to work for
recovery  organisations  and  the  KNIL  after  their  imprisonment,  but  their  physical  and
mental  condition did  not  allow them to work.  Other  plans were  adjusted,  such as  the
cancellation of the Australian offer to house and train Dutch forces, and the changes in
American  strategy  in  how  to  defeat  the  Japanese.  These  international  developments
heavily influenced the Dutch planning for restoration of colonial rule. 
After  the start  of  the Japanese occupation,  soldiers of  the KNIL were captured.
Some of them, mostly Javanese, were released after a few months, while most Dutch
soldiers were used as forced labourers during the entire war. After the Second World War
ended, the Americans and British recovered the POWs. In SWPA areas, the Americans
gathered them in Manila, where they stayed until the Americans and Australians decided to
move these troops to Borneo.  In British areas, the former POWs were recovered and
brought to central cities, where they were forced to wait for months until they were allowed
onto Java and Sumatra.  There,  they joined interest  groups,  that  served as provisional
army units as well. 
The Indonesian independence proclamation was followed by a violent revolutionary
period, that aggravated after the arrival of British forces and Dutch NICA members late
September 1945. The presence of newly formed KNIL groups, that consisted of Moluccans
and  Dutch  former  POWs,  British  and  British  Indian  soldiers,  provoked  violence  with
Indonesian nationalists. The Indonesian nationalist movement was supported by pemuda
that did not hesitate to use violence against these newly established army units, but also
against  civilians  inside  and  outside  Japanese  internment  camps.  British  forces  were
unable to control the situation and decided to only occupy key areas on Java and Sumatra.
This failed strategy and the severe outcomes of the Battle of Surabaya made the British
decide to  not  allow more Dutch troops to  repatriate  to  Java and Sumatra,  since their
presence  could  provoke  more  violence.  This  decision  meant  that  KNIL  soldiers  were
forced to stay in camps around Southeast Asia, some of them even until the summer of
1946. For this reason, re-establishment of the KNIL was impeded. Dutch plans had to be
adjusted to the political situation in the Netherlands East Indies and the subsequent British
decisions.
British and Dutch leaders disagreed on the strategy that they wanted to use in
restoration of colonial rule. Army leaders preferred to fight the armed nationalists, while
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colonial  politicians Van Mook and Van der Plas eventually admitted to talking with the
republican leaders. During the remaining time of the Indonesian Independence War, this
difference of opinion between army and politicians would exist. Disagreements between
colonial  leaders  and  Hague  politicians  whether  to  negotiate  with  Republicans  also
remained: 'The Hague' wanted to decide on colonial policy, while colonial leaders claimed
to know more about the local situation, and thus wanted to decide themselves.
After  the Japanese surrender,  colonial  leaders had false expectations about  the
condition of the former POWs. They assumed that these men could recover quickly and be
deployed again soon. Most former POWs however were war-weary and wanted to return
home to the Netherlands East Indies to be united with their families again. They described
their living conditions during and after the Second World War in their egodocuments, and
reached out for help about their miserable post-war situation in letters to the Queen and
organisations like NICA. Between the army command and colonial government on the one
side, and the KNIL soldiers on the other side, expectations about the possibilities of the
KNIL were thus very different. Many former POWs continued to experiences mental and
physical difficulties after re-establishment of the colonial  army, although they had been
considered fit for duty.
Between 1945 and 1950, the KNIL was able to redeem some of its pre-war honour.
For the around 130,000 newly arrived soldiers, war volunteers and conscripts, from the
Netherlands, the knowledge and experience of KNIL soldiers in fighting colonial wars was
indispensable. After the recognition of independence in 1949, the KNIL was liquidated on
26 July 1950. Its soldiers were demobilised or transferred to the KL or TNI. After failed tries
to  find  a  solution  for  Moluccan  KNIL  soldiers,  who  did  not  want  to  transfer  to  the
Indonesian  Republic's  army,  it  was  decided  that  they  would  be  transported  to  the
Netherlands. The government's attitude about the KNIL soldiers in 1945 influenced the
soldiers'  thinking in 1950 and during the aftermath of decolonisation. KNIL soldiers felt
disrespected, as is also clear from the backpay affair. This standoff was only settled in
early 2016, when the Dutch government decided to pay the last salaries of former POWs.
It did not do this for legal obligations, but because of 'moral responsibilities'. The feelings
of disrespect and undervaluation that KNIL soldiers had, seem to have never disappeared.
Dutch colonial  leaders had several expectations for restoration of colonial  rule and re-
establishment  of  the  KNIL  in  the  Netherlands  East  Indies,  of  which  many  were
mismanaged. The colonial government could not live up to prior promises it had made to
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its colonial soldiers, due to international developments and changes. The colonial leaders'
hubristic attitude made them ignorant for changes that had developed, while at the same
time they were unable to influence many international decisions that were made about the
Netherlands  East  Indies.  The  colonial  government  underestimated  the  strength  of  the
nationalist  movement,  both  in  dispersion  of  ideas  and  in  military  power.  Also
underestimated was the severity of the Japanese occupation and forced labour that the
POWs experienced. The Dutch were dependent on the Allies, who took many decisions
that influenced the Netherlands East Indies. It seems that the Dutch were incapable and
unwilling to change this situation. This however could be subject of more research, that
both addresses international problems and developments, as well as Dutch reactions to it.
This thesis research aims to provide insight in a difficult and 'forgotten' period in history,
which  was  very  important  for  the  course  of  the  Independence  War  and  thus  for  the
decolonisation of the Netherlands East Indies and the end of the Dutch Empire.
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List of abbreviations
ALFSEA Allied Land Forces Southeast Asia
BB Binnenlands Bestuur
BS Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten
BSO Bevelhebber Strijdkrachten in het Oosten
CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff
IFTU Inhabitants friendly to us
KDP Kantoor Displaced Persons
KL Koninklijke Landmacht
KNIL Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger
KM Koninklijke Marine
LOC Leger Organisatie Centrum
NA National Archive, The Hague
NEFIS Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service
NIBEG Nederlands-Indische Bond voor Ex-Krijgsgevangenen en Geïnterneerden
NICA Netherlands Indies Civil Administration
POW Prisoner of war
RAPWI Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees
SACSEA Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia
SEAC Southeast Asia Command
SWPA Southwest Pacific Area
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia
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